Monday, 13 May 2013
The persistent Mr Kerry
The rusting engine of the peace process seems to be coughing its way back into life. Stalled since September 2010, when Israel’s 10-month freeze on construction in the West Bank came to an end and was not renewed, US President Obama – just starting his second term – seems determined to kick-start the motor into action. Will he ever get it to a desirable destination, humming along on all eight cylinders? Precedent and the odds are against him, but politics is an unpredictable game.
The new US Secretary of State, John Kelly, charged with reinvigorating Arab-Israeli relations, has set about his task with a refreshing enthusiasm.
An early success was initiating a rapprochement between Israel and Turkey – a month later still somewhat shaky, but undeniably in existence. Since then he has, with dash and dynamism, striven to facilitate a resumption of face-to-face negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (the PA). It was a triumph of diplomatic adroitness on his part to organise a meeting of Arab League foreign ministers in Washington, hosted by him in conjunction with Vice-President Joe Biden. It was an even greater coup to obtain from them a concession – tiny though it may seem, and instantly rejected by hostile voices as it was – that modified the spirit of the original Arab Peace Proposal of 2002. Following the discussions, the Arab League ministers conceded that the borders of a future sovereign Palestine need not be precisely the boundaries between Israel and the West Bank on 4 June 1967 (the day before the Six-Day War), but could be the subject of “minor land swaps.”
The statement by Qatari Prime Minister Sheik al-Thani at the end of the meeting, confirming the delegation’s agreement to this modification, acted as a political catalyst. It suddenly seemed, in both Washington and Jerusalem, that meaningful peace negotiations might once again be a possibility.
A flurry of diplomatic activity ensued. Tzipi Livni, Israel’s Justice Minister responsible also for peace negotiations, flew over to Washington to discuss the developing situation with him. A few days later, Kerry was off to Rome to meet with Jordanian foreign minister, Nasser Judeh. The result? A declaration by Kerry that Jordan, because of its geographical and diplomatic affinity with Israel, was an essential partner to peace.
“It is absolutely critical,” said Kerry, “for all of us to try to move speedily and with focus to try to get to a place where everybody understands we are engaged in a serious process to reopen negotiations. Jordan will play a key role in that.”
Meanwhile Tzipi Livni repacked her overnight bag, and took her own flight to Rome, where once again she was on the scene to follow up Kerry’s breakneck initiative. Back in Israel, Livni lauded Kerry’s dynamism which, she said, had given the peace process a new momentum.
Even Fatah seems to have caught a whiff of the new “can-do” spirit. On 11 May 2013 the Fatah Central Committee not only welcomed US efforts to revive the peace process, but formally accepted the Arab League’s proposal to authorise land swaps with Israel when determining the borders of a future Palestine. Hamas would endorse neither position.
The real question, of course, is whether all this energy and enthusiasm is leading either Israel or the Palestinians to a desirable destination. The declared objective is two states living side by side in peace and cooperation. Rejected are two versions of the one-state solution – the Hamas doctrine of Palestine “from the river to the sea” with Israel eliminated from the scene, and the bizarre proposal from Israel’s hard-liners to annex Judea and Samaria and pay its Arab inhabitants to re-settle elsewhere. The consequence of this hare-brained scheme seems obvious – not a government in the world would recognise this land-grab. Israel would have added its friends to the already long enough list of its enemies, and guaranteed for itself a future of continuous conflict both diplomatic and military.
On the other hand, continuous conflict is the fear underlying Israel’s right-wing extremists. Inviting one’s enemy into one’s drawing-room, so that he can the more easily cut your throat, seems to them quixotic – and would indeed be so, unless copper-bottomed guarantees of future security for Israel are built into any final peace accord. Can such assurances indeed be formulated and agreed between the parties? One of the many questions still hanging in the air.
No doubt another tricky conundrum is exercising John Kerry and his officials – how to achieve a sovereign Palestine when a vital piece of the jigsaw, namely the Gaza strip, home to well over a million Palestinians, is missing. They have no doubt considered that one unsatisfactory, and interim, outcome to Kerry’s current peace efforts might be a West Bank Palestine run by the Fatah-dominated PA, and a Gazan mini-Islamist state run by Hamas. They may calculate that once Gazan Palestinians see an actual sovereign Palestine up and running, the political atmosphere might change, rejectionism might lose its appeal, and the PA might be able to resume its authority within Gaza. Wishful thinking? Undoubtedly.
Meanwhile it appears that John Kerry has given himself until 7 June to announce the results of his current efforts to resume peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians. It’s not so long. We wait with bated breath.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 13 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/13052013-the-persistent-mr-kerry-oped/
Sunday, 12 May 2013
Post-conflict Syria
When the dust settles on Syria’s civil war, what sort of a situation will the world in general, and the Middle East in particular, be facing? Even if Russia and the US manage in their current discussions to agree that a negotiated settlement is the way forward, there is no guarantee that either the Assad régime or the official opposition would come to the table without imposing conditions that the other side would find unacceptable. A negotiated settlement, moreover, takes no account of the aims, ambitions and interests of the score of other bodies – jihadists, Islamists, extremists – that have attached themselves to one side or the other in the conflict, hoping to achieve some particular advantage at the end of the day.
Chief among these “hangers-on”, in what began as a home-grown protest movement à la Arab Spring, is the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iran has long had political ambitions regarding Syria. Over the years it has invested huge resources in converting Syria to the Shi’ite version of Islam, and in its heyday the Assad régime freely allowed Iranian missionaries into the country to strengthen the Shi’ite faith. Now, in addition to instigating the transfer of tens of thousands of Hezbollah troops from Lebanon to fight for Bashar Assad in Syria, Iran is reported to be building up a sister organisation to Hezbollah, recruited from Shi’ite forces in Iraq, to further strengthen Assad’s régime. The particular mission of these troops, known as the League of the Righteous and Kateeb Hezbollah, is to defend the Shi’ite centres in Damascus.
Syria is an indispensible element in Iran's strategy to achieve hegemony in the Middle East. In January 2012 General Qasem Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, declared that, in “one way or another”, the Islamic Republic controlled Iraq and South Lebanon. Now, with the old collaborative arrangement between two independent régimes looking increasingly shaky, control of Syria is in their sights. Mehdi Taaib, who heads the think tank of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, recently stated that “Syria is the 35th district of Iran and it has greater strategic importance for Iran than Khuzestan [an Arab-populated district inside Iran].”
A few weeks ago, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah paid a secret visit to Tehran where he met with the top Iranian officials headed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and General Suleimani, who had prepared an operational plan for winning the civil conflict in Syria. The Arab political weekly, Al-Shiraa, published in Lebanon, reported on 15 March 2013 that the Suleiman plan includes three elements:
1) the establishment of a popular sectarian army made up of Shi’ites and Alawites, to be backed by forces from Iran, Iraq, Hezbollah, and symbolic contingents from the Persian Gulf;
2) this force is to total 150,000 fighters;
3) it will be integrated with the Syrian army.
Suleimani himself visited Syria in late February-early March to prepare for the implementation of his plan.
It is, perhaps, significant that all this Iranian-led manipulation of Hezbollah does not go unchallenged within Lebanon. NOW is an on-line Lebanese journal, published in English and Arabic, covering Lebanon, the Lebanese diaspora and the Middle East. On 4 May it published an article claiming that, in his visit to Iran, Hassan Nasrallah received guidance on how to present Hezbollah’s escalating – and increasingly unpopular – involvement in Syria to the Lebanese public.
Hezbollah, though in fact a sectarian Shi'ite militia, has long sought to enhance its legitimacy in the Sunni Arab world by presenting itself as a non-sectarian, pan-Islamic resistance movement against Israel. But its activities in Syria do not fit this picture, and Hezbollah has been having trouble in portraying its involvement to the Lebanese public, especially in view of the increasing number of fighters killed in the conflict
Subhi Tufayli, the first head of Hezbollah who was dismissed from its leadership by Iran at the start of the 1990s, has been one of the prominent critics of Hezbollah’s incursion into Syria. Tufayli recently claimed that 138 Hezbollah fighters had been killed there along with scores of wounded who were brought to hospitals in Lebanon. Ceremonies for burial of the dead are frequently held clandestinely, sometimes at night, so as to avoid anger and resentment. The families, however, have raised harsh questions about such unnecessary sacrifice that is not within the sacred framework of jihad against Israel, which Hezbollah claims as its raison d’être.
Hezbollah needs a convincing narrative, beyond the fact that it serves Iran’s regional interests, to justify the toll of dead and wounded from its Syrian adventure. Conjuring up the spectre of hostile Sunnis coming after Shi’ite villages and religious places serves that purpose. So, in a recent speech on Hezbollah’s TV station, Nasrallah offered that up as the rationale for the movement’s involvement in Syria.
But Hezbollah, and Iran standing behind it, relies on its pan-Islamic, anti-Israel stance for its popular support. Which explains the despatch of a drone over northern Israel a few weeks ago. . As NOW put it: “Although Nasrallah reiterated his party’s denial that it was behind the drone he, and the group more broadly, were clearly taking credit for it and boasting about it as an achievement.”
The drone was almost certainly authorised by Iran’s leaders during Nasrallah’s visit to Tehran – as was Hezbollah’s reaction following it. The drone, via a nod and a wink, would be Hezbollah refocusing the public’s attention on its anti-Israel activities, but it would not go the whole hog and claim responsibility. A retaliatory Israeli attack on Lebanon is far from what Iran’s leaders want at present; they would prefer to safeguard Hezbollah’s military capabilities in readiness to counter any strike on their nuclear programme.
So in Syria Hezbollah is engaged in building Iran’s new strategy, acting in tandem with Iran against the Sunni Islamic groups that threaten Iran’s interests in that benighted country. For at the end of the day, Hezbollah is not a Lebanese national movement but a creation of Iran and subject to its exclusive authority.
As Dr Shimon Shapira, of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, wrote recently: “For the Islamic Republic, this is a war of survival against a radical Sunni uprising that views Iran and the Shi'ites as infidels to be annihilated. This is the real war being waged today, and it is within Islam. From Iran’s standpoint, if the extreme Sunnis of the al-Qaeda persuasion are not defeated in Syria, they will assert themselves in Iraq and threaten to take over the Persian Gulf, posing a real danger to Iran’s regional hegemony. Khamenei does not intend to give in.”
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line magazine, 13 May 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=312997&prmusr=70l5TDetZc4NWv8%2fSI14YkGYvAjkxc%2bEqMfZ%2fdhwwqqrMecR7q3y4oZdzQ6R4XBa
Published in the Eurasia Review, 15 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/15052013-post-conflict-syria-oped/
Wednesday, 8 May 2013
Iran and the Sunni extremists
Iran is a non-Arab Muslim state that adheres to an extreme form of Shi’ite Islam. In the Shi’ite axis through which Iran conducts its regional policy (Iran-Syria-Hezbollah in Lebanon), Syria forms a vital link – which is why Iran is expending every effort to keep Bashar Assad in power. Supported by Iran, Shia fundamentalists in their thousands have flocked to Assad’s banner, and are in deadly conflict with the thousands of Sunni jihadists who have joined the opposition forces that are battling to overthrow the Assad régime.
For example, the assassination attempt on the Syrian Prime Minister, Wael Al-Halki, on Monday 29 April, was pretty clearly an operation carried out by one of the extremist Sunni groups that have affiliated themselves to the anti-Assad rebellion.
In particular the military wing of Hezbollah, the terrorist organisation set up in Lebanon by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in the 1980s, is heavily engaged in the Syrian civil conflict, determined to ensure that the Assad régime is not swept away. If eventually a political settlement is reached between the Syrian rebels and the Syrian government, then Hezbollah’s power and influence, already great and growing within Lebanon’s body politic, would have spilt over into its vastly larger Syrian neighbour. In that eventuality the Gulf states, all of which, with the exception of Bahrain, are Sunni Muslim, would be locked in a sort of Shi’ite pincer – and, as the recent release of Wikileaks documents revealed, virtually all of them greatly fear that Iran aims to topple their régimes and dominate the region.
Yet in the convoluted, Byzantine world of Islamic fundamentalism, “my enemy’s enemy is sometimes my friend”, and Shi’ite and Sunni jihadists are agreed at least on a common enemy – Israel. A visceral hatred of Judaism and Jews has been hot-wired into the extreme Islamist world view, and to jihadists of either persuasion Israel as a Jewish state is literally intolerable. As a result, Shi’ite Iran has been far from consistent in its relations with Sunni extremists.
For example, united by a desire to destroy Israel, Iran has consistently supplied the Sunni terrorist organisation Hamas in the Gaza strip with ever-more sophisticated weaponry. As a result the volume and range of the rockets fired from Gaza indiscriminately on civilian targets inside Israel increased to a point when, in 2012, Israel felt obliged for a second time to respond to the continued provocation by a direct military assault.
Now, evidence is emerging that Iran is looking for new ways to reopen its supply lines to Hamas. Rather than risk detection by the Israeli navy, Iran is trying to link up with the hard-line Sunni Muslim government in Sudan to smuggle arms to Gaza, passing through Egypt where another Islamist Sunni government is in power.
“In short,” wrote the distinguished columnist Con Coughlin recently, “Iran has no problem working with its Sunni rivals when it suits its interests to do so – and this should worry us.”
Another disturbing phenomenon is the on-off working relationship between Shi’ite Iran and Sunni Al-Qaeda. Divided by race and religion, they are not natural allies: what unites them is their loathing of the US and Israel. This common hatred was sufficient, following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, to persuade Iran to grant refuge to bin Laden’s daughter, Fatima, and four of his sons – Othman, Mohammed, Laden and Sa’ad – along with various other key Al-Qaeda figures Including former security chief, Saif al-Adel. Now the US believes that Saif al-Adel's father-in-law, Mustafa Hamid, is the link between Al-Qaeda and the Iranian government.
A recent incident linking them is the pre-emptive arrest last week of two men suspected of a plot to derail a passenger train in Toronto. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police said the surveillance operation leading to the arrests was "a result of extensive collaborative efforts" – FBI agents from the US were said to be involved in helping foil the attack – and that the terrorist operation had been planned with support from Al-Qaeda elements in Iran.
Canada's Globe and Mail, reporting that the arrested men had been under investigation for months, asserted that the planned terrorist attack involved a Toronto-New York City train and, in the words of New York Republican Representative Peter King, was intended "to cause significant loss of human life including New Yorkers."
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi described the accusation as “the most hilarious thing I've heard in my 64 years." However Jonathan Eyal, head of security studies at the Royal United Services Institute, has said: ”The Canadian claim that this plot has been engineered on Iranian soil is entirely plausible. Western intelligence agencies have known for a long time about the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives in Iran.”
So yes, as and when it suits the Iranian regime and advances their global strategic objectives, Iran will provide support to extremist Sunni groups like Al-Qaeda and Hamas, and these Sunni fundamentalists will accept it. But outside observers need to bear in mind that, in the eyes of hard-line Sunni salafists, the Shia faith is a heresy – indeed some challenge the right of Shi’ites to call themselves Muslim at all. Some Wahabi groups, often designated “takfiri” and sometimes linked to Al-Qaeda, have even advocated the persecution of the Shia as heretics. Such groups have been allegedly responsible for violent attacks and suicide bombings at Shi’ite gatherings at mosques and shrines, most notably in Iraq during the Ashura mourning ceremonies in 2005, where hundreds of Shias were killed in coordinated suicide bombings.
It is some consolation to reflect that cooperation resting on such uncertain foundations is unlikely to be either solid or permanent – and that, effectively challenged, it would almost certainly prove vulnerable.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30042013-iran-and-the-sunni-extremists-oped/
For example, the assassination attempt on the Syrian Prime Minister, Wael Al-Halki, on Monday 29 April, was pretty clearly an operation carried out by one of the extremist Sunni groups that have affiliated themselves to the anti-Assad rebellion.
In particular the military wing of Hezbollah, the terrorist organisation set up in Lebanon by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in the 1980s, is heavily engaged in the Syrian civil conflict, determined to ensure that the Assad régime is not swept away. If eventually a political settlement is reached between the Syrian rebels and the Syrian government, then Hezbollah’s power and influence, already great and growing within Lebanon’s body politic, would have spilt over into its vastly larger Syrian neighbour. In that eventuality the Gulf states, all of which, with the exception of Bahrain, are Sunni Muslim, would be locked in a sort of Shi’ite pincer – and, as the recent release of Wikileaks documents revealed, virtually all of them greatly fear that Iran aims to topple their régimes and dominate the region.
Yet in the convoluted, Byzantine world of Islamic fundamentalism, “my enemy’s enemy is sometimes my friend”, and Shi’ite and Sunni jihadists are agreed at least on a common enemy – Israel. A visceral hatred of Judaism and Jews has been hot-wired into the extreme Islamist world view, and to jihadists of either persuasion Israel as a Jewish state is literally intolerable. As a result, Shi’ite Iran has been far from consistent in its relations with Sunni extremists.
For example, united by a desire to destroy Israel, Iran has consistently supplied the Sunni terrorist organisation Hamas in the Gaza strip with ever-more sophisticated weaponry. As a result the volume and range of the rockets fired from Gaza indiscriminately on civilian targets inside Israel increased to a point when, in 2012, Israel felt obliged for a second time to respond to the continued provocation by a direct military assault.
Now, evidence is emerging that Iran is looking for new ways to reopen its supply lines to Hamas. Rather than risk detection by the Israeli navy, Iran is trying to link up with the hard-line Sunni Muslim government in Sudan to smuggle arms to Gaza, passing through Egypt where another Islamist Sunni government is in power.
“In short,” wrote the distinguished columnist Con Coughlin recently, “Iran has no problem working with its Sunni rivals when it suits its interests to do so – and this should worry us.”
Another disturbing phenomenon is the on-off working relationship between Shi’ite Iran and Sunni Al-Qaeda. Divided by race and religion, they are not natural allies: what unites them is their loathing of the US and Israel. This common hatred was sufficient, following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, to persuade Iran to grant refuge to bin Laden’s daughter, Fatima, and four of his sons – Othman, Mohammed, Laden and Sa’ad – along with various other key Al-Qaeda figures Including former security chief, Saif al-Adel. Now the US believes that Saif al-Adel's father-in-law, Mustafa Hamid, is the link between Al-Qaeda and the Iranian government.
A recent incident linking them is the pre-emptive arrest last week of two men suspected of a plot to derail a passenger train in Toronto. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police said the surveillance operation leading to the arrests was "a result of extensive collaborative efforts" – FBI agents from the US were said to be involved in helping foil the attack – and that the terrorist operation had been planned with support from Al-Qaeda elements in Iran.
Canada's Globe and Mail, reporting that the arrested men had been under investigation for months, asserted that the planned terrorist attack involved a Toronto-New York City train and, in the words of New York Republican Representative Peter King, was intended "to cause significant loss of human life including New Yorkers."
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi described the accusation as “the most hilarious thing I've heard in my 64 years." However Jonathan Eyal, head of security studies at the Royal United Services Institute, has said: ”The Canadian claim that this plot has been engineered on Iranian soil is entirely plausible. Western intelligence agencies have known for a long time about the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives in Iran.”
So yes, as and when it suits the Iranian regime and advances their global strategic objectives, Iran will provide support to extremist Sunni groups like Al-Qaeda and Hamas, and these Sunni fundamentalists will accept it. But outside observers need to bear in mind that, in the eyes of hard-line Sunni salafists, the Shia faith is a heresy – indeed some challenge the right of Shi’ites to call themselves Muslim at all. Some Wahabi groups, often designated “takfiri” and sometimes linked to Al-Qaeda, have even advocated the persecution of the Shia as heretics. Such groups have been allegedly responsible for violent attacks and suicide bombings at Shi’ite gatherings at mosques and shrines, most notably in Iraq during the Ashura mourning ceremonies in 2005, where hundreds of Shias were killed in coordinated suicide bombings.
It is some consolation to reflect that cooperation resting on such uncertain foundations is unlikely to be either solid or permanent – and that, effectively challenged, it would almost certainly prove vulnerable.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30042013-iran-and-the-sunni-extremists-oped/
Thursday, 2 May 2013
Israel and Palestine: signs of a thaw
Yes, in these early days of May 2013 cracks are appearing in the solidly frozen iceberg that has been the Israel-Palestine peace process over the past two-and-a half-years. Is this the start of a genuine thaw? Too early to say – but the atmosphere is certainly warming up.
From the moment US President Barack Obama assumed office for his second term in January 2013, he made it clear that his administration would accord a high degree of priority to tackling the Arab-Israel conflict in general, and the Israel-Palestine issue in particular. In point of fact he had attempted to do just that, back in January 2009, but subsequent events had demonstrated all too clearly that his first effort had gone disastrously wrong. He would not make the same mistakes a second time.
It was on 22 January 2009, in a special ceremony in the White House, that newly-elected President Barack Obama named George Mitchell his "special envoy to the Middle East" charged with seeking a "comprehensive peace". The event, attended also by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was widely interpreted as a determination on Obama's part to involve himself and his new administration in working for, and in finally achieving, a settlement to the long-running Arab-Israel dispute.
At the ceremony Mitchell said that, along with Obama and Clinton, he believed the objective of a Jewish state and a Palestinian state living side by side was possible, and that the conflict, old as it was, could be resolved.
In March 2009 the Obama administration explicitly incorporated into US policy the 2002 Arab League peace plan, originally mooted by Saudi Arabia, under which the Arab world undertook formally to recognise Israel and enter into normal relations with her in exchange, inter alia, for Israel's withdrawing from territories captured in the 1967 war. Three months later President Obama, in an unprecedented move, reached out to the Muslim world in a speech in Cairo. The "cycle of suspicion and discord" between the United States and the Muslim world, he declared, must end. He called for a "new beginning"; both sides needed to make a "sustained effort... to respect one another and seek common ground". The US bond with Israel was unbreakable, he said, but the Palestinians' plight was "intolerable".
To the fledgling administration in Washington, this initiative by America’s first black president must have seemed a bold, unprecedented step well worth the effort. Perhaps this president, with his Black Power background, could achieve things that no other could even have contemplated.
It was not long before reality overtook aspirations. It quickly became apparent that all the overtures in the world counted for nothing against the reality of Iran's nuclear ambitions. As for Syria, when reports emerged of their transfer of a batch of highly sophisticated Scud missiles to the terrorist organisation Hezbollah in Lebanon, Obama’s plan to reinstate formal diplomatic relations was put on hold. In Gaza, the Islamist terrorist group Hamas, having seized control of the Strip in a bloody internecine coup d'état, remained virtually at war with Fatah, its rivals within the Palestinian Authority, and deeply opposed to any accommodation with, or even recognition of, Israel.
So although George Mitchell’s unremitting efforts did result, in September 2010, in the first of a few face-to-face meetings between Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, they soon petered out. They foundered on Obama’s own outright condemnation of the resumption of construction in Israel’s West Bank settlements, following the 10-month building freeze that he had persuaded Netanyahu to institute. Construction in the West Bank had never previously inhibited peace talks between the PA and Israel, but with the US President condemning them outright, Abbas had been painted into a corner and could scarcely do less.
Obama’s second effort has so far endeavoured to by-pass the obstacles in his first. There has been no renewal of his overtures to the Muslim world. On the contrary, he made a point of visiting Israel early in his second term, and reiterating his support for a renewal of the peace process – a support which made no direct reference to construction in the West Bank. He has voiced a hard line against Iran’s continued nuclear activity, although not perhaps as hard a line as Israel’s prime minister – also in office for a further term – might wish. He has called for Syria’s President Bashar Assad to step down, in light of the remorseless hammering of his own civilian population in the course of his civil conflict.
And to carry forward the administration’s policy of achieving a settlement of the Israel-Palestine dispute, President Obama has designated not a “special envoy” but the Secretary of State himself, John Kerry.
Kerry has been notably vigorous and enthusiastic in tackling his formidable task. Unsparing of his personal convenience, he began his new effort with a succession of visits to the region – three in as many weeks. An early, if partial, success was his brokering of a somewhat shaky rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Meanwhile the US quietly unblocked almost $500 million in aid to the PA which had been frozen by Congress for months, and Kerry promised further economic assistance in developing the Palestinian economy, presumably as a sweetener to the PA to return to meaningful negotiations.
Kerry wanted the Arab League to play a role in the process, to ensure that any future peace negotiations had as wide a backing across the Arab world as possible, and to out-manoeuvre the Islamist rejectionists. Most members of the League are hostile to Islamist fundamentalists, opposed as the jihadists are to any accommodation with Israel, but also to many stable Arab régimes which they regard as over-secular in character.
On the last day of April 2013, Kerry and US Vice-President Joe Biden hosted an Arab League delegation, which included the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and Qatar, and senior officials from Lebanon, the PA and Saudi Arabia. The discussions focused on the principles of the 2002 Arab League Initiative, which proposed full Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for a return to the boundaries of 4 June 1967 (the day before the outbreak of the Six-Day War), the inclusion of East Jerusalem in a future Palestinian state and the return of Palestinian refugees to what is now Israel.
Israel had never formally rejected the Arab peace plan, but nor did it ever accept it. One objection, of several, was the principle of establishing the border of a sovereign Palestine along the cease-fire line of the Israeli and Jordanian armies in 1949 – which is what the 1967 boundary was. In 1967 there was no recognized international border between the West Bank and Israel. The Armistice line was the position on the ground when the fighting stopped. In fact, Article II of the Armistice with Jordan explicitly specified that the agreement did not compromise any future territorial claims of the parties, since it had been "dictated exclusively by military considerations."
As Dr Dore Gold, the renowned expert on Middle East affairs, has pointed out, after the Six-Day War the architects of UN Security Council Resolution 242 insisted that the old armistice line had to be replaced with a new border. "Which is why," Dr Gold writes, "Resolution 242 did not call for a full withdrawal from all the territories that Israel captured in the Six Day War; the 1949 Armistice lines were no longer to be a reference point for a future peace process."
US President Lyndon Johnson made this very point in September 1968: "It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of 4 June 1967 will not bring peace. There must be secure and there must be recognized borders."
The 1949 Armistice line, of course, takes no account of geographical and demographic changes over the past 64 years, so it must be regarded as something of a triumph for John Kerry that, in his meeting with them, the Arab League delegation softened its stance on this issue. Qatari Prime Minister Sheik al-Thani said that the delegation agreed to the possibility of “comparable,” mutually agreed and “minor” land swaps between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
“We’ve had a very positive, very constructive discussion,” said Kerry. “The Arab League delegation affirmed…the two-state solution on the basis of the 4th of June 1967 line* [*note “line” not “border” - NT], with the (possibility) of comparable and mutual agreed minor swaps of the land.”
Israel’s President Shimon Peres, in his visit to Pope Francis on 30 April, designated this development as “a new opportunity for peace.” Prime Minister Netanyahu said on 2 May to a visiting delegation of five US congressmen: “We’re engaged right now in an effort that we appreciate, led by President Obama and Secretary John Kerry, to restart the peace negotiations between us and the Palestinians. We’re eager to do it; we have no preconditions.”
What was not said in the statement by the Arab League, however, is almost as significant as what was – for the League made no mention of Hamas, the Islamist terrorist organization that is the elephant in the room. Controlling a large proportion of any future sovereign Palestine, viscerally opposed to recognizing, let alone negotiating with, Israel, and almost certainly aiming to oust both Abbas from the PA presidency and Fatah from control of the PA, Hamas represents a major obstacle to any peace process as long as it remains in control of Gaza. Most of the knotty problems requiring resolution in a final peace agreement have been discussed ad nauseam in the years of previous negotiations between the two sides, and have pretty obvious answers. What to do about Hamas and the Gaza Strip in any final accommodation remains a loose end.
Kerry’s next move? Well, according to some sources it could be hosting a four-way summit, as a precursor to renewed negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This speculation – which, it must be acknowledged, has been denied by official US spokespersons – also indicated that Turkey, Egypt and other Arab countries might be invited to participate in the summit, though at what level was not made clear. According to these sources, Kerry discussed the planned summit in his recent meetings in Istanbul with the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers, as well as with PA President Abbas. It might also have been be discussed at the White House meeting between President Obama and King Abdullah on 26 April, and could feature on the agenda in the planned mid-May Washington visit by Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Putting aside all speculation, it seems clear that Kerry has taken up his Middle East challenge with energy and enthusiasm. Through undoubted diplomatic skill and the application of sheer persistence, he has injected renewed animation into what many had already written off as a defunct corpse. Whether he and President Obama can succeed in the major enterprise to which they have dedicated themselves – the conclusion of a genuine peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians – where so many have failed before them, time alone will tell. From the standpoint of these early days of May 2013, all we can say is that they have made a positive start.
Published in shortened form in Eurasia Review, 2 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/02052013-israel-and-palestine-signs-of-a-thaw-oped/
From the moment US President Barack Obama assumed office for his second term in January 2013, he made it clear that his administration would accord a high degree of priority to tackling the Arab-Israel conflict in general, and the Israel-Palestine issue in particular. In point of fact he had attempted to do just that, back in January 2009, but subsequent events had demonstrated all too clearly that his first effort had gone disastrously wrong. He would not make the same mistakes a second time.
It was on 22 January 2009, in a special ceremony in the White House, that newly-elected President Barack Obama named George Mitchell his "special envoy to the Middle East" charged with seeking a "comprehensive peace". The event, attended also by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was widely interpreted as a determination on Obama's part to involve himself and his new administration in working for, and in finally achieving, a settlement to the long-running Arab-Israel dispute.
At the ceremony Mitchell said that, along with Obama and Clinton, he believed the objective of a Jewish state and a Palestinian state living side by side was possible, and that the conflict, old as it was, could be resolved.
In March 2009 the Obama administration explicitly incorporated into US policy the 2002 Arab League peace plan, originally mooted by Saudi Arabia, under which the Arab world undertook formally to recognise Israel and enter into normal relations with her in exchange, inter alia, for Israel's withdrawing from territories captured in the 1967 war. Three months later President Obama, in an unprecedented move, reached out to the Muslim world in a speech in Cairo. The "cycle of suspicion and discord" between the United States and the Muslim world, he declared, must end. He called for a "new beginning"; both sides needed to make a "sustained effort... to respect one another and seek common ground". The US bond with Israel was unbreakable, he said, but the Palestinians' plight was "intolerable".
To the fledgling administration in Washington, this initiative by America’s first black president must have seemed a bold, unprecedented step well worth the effort. Perhaps this president, with his Black Power background, could achieve things that no other could even have contemplated.
It was not long before reality overtook aspirations. It quickly became apparent that all the overtures in the world counted for nothing against the reality of Iran's nuclear ambitions. As for Syria, when reports emerged of their transfer of a batch of highly sophisticated Scud missiles to the terrorist organisation Hezbollah in Lebanon, Obama’s plan to reinstate formal diplomatic relations was put on hold. In Gaza, the Islamist terrorist group Hamas, having seized control of the Strip in a bloody internecine coup d'état, remained virtually at war with Fatah, its rivals within the Palestinian Authority, and deeply opposed to any accommodation with, or even recognition of, Israel.
So although George Mitchell’s unremitting efforts did result, in September 2010, in the first of a few face-to-face meetings between Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, they soon petered out. They foundered on Obama’s own outright condemnation of the resumption of construction in Israel’s West Bank settlements, following the 10-month building freeze that he had persuaded Netanyahu to institute. Construction in the West Bank had never previously inhibited peace talks between the PA and Israel, but with the US President condemning them outright, Abbas had been painted into a corner and could scarcely do less.
Obama’s second effort has so far endeavoured to by-pass the obstacles in his first. There has been no renewal of his overtures to the Muslim world. On the contrary, he made a point of visiting Israel early in his second term, and reiterating his support for a renewal of the peace process – a support which made no direct reference to construction in the West Bank. He has voiced a hard line against Iran’s continued nuclear activity, although not perhaps as hard a line as Israel’s prime minister – also in office for a further term – might wish. He has called for Syria’s President Bashar Assad to step down, in light of the remorseless hammering of his own civilian population in the course of his civil conflict.
And to carry forward the administration’s policy of achieving a settlement of the Israel-Palestine dispute, President Obama has designated not a “special envoy” but the Secretary of State himself, John Kerry.
Kerry has been notably vigorous and enthusiastic in tackling his formidable task. Unsparing of his personal convenience, he began his new effort with a succession of visits to the region – three in as many weeks. An early, if partial, success was his brokering of a somewhat shaky rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Meanwhile the US quietly unblocked almost $500 million in aid to the PA which had been frozen by Congress for months, and Kerry promised further economic assistance in developing the Palestinian economy, presumably as a sweetener to the PA to return to meaningful negotiations.
Kerry wanted the Arab League to play a role in the process, to ensure that any future peace negotiations had as wide a backing across the Arab world as possible, and to out-manoeuvre the Islamist rejectionists. Most members of the League are hostile to Islamist fundamentalists, opposed as the jihadists are to any accommodation with Israel, but also to many stable Arab régimes which they regard as over-secular in character.
On the last day of April 2013, Kerry and US Vice-President Joe Biden hosted an Arab League delegation, which included the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and Qatar, and senior officials from Lebanon, the PA and Saudi Arabia. The discussions focused on the principles of the 2002 Arab League Initiative, which proposed full Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for a return to the boundaries of 4 June 1967 (the day before the outbreak of the Six-Day War), the inclusion of East Jerusalem in a future Palestinian state and the return of Palestinian refugees to what is now Israel.
Israel had never formally rejected the Arab peace plan, but nor did it ever accept it. One objection, of several, was the principle of establishing the border of a sovereign Palestine along the cease-fire line of the Israeli and Jordanian armies in 1949 – which is what the 1967 boundary was. In 1967 there was no recognized international border between the West Bank and Israel. The Armistice line was the position on the ground when the fighting stopped. In fact, Article II of the Armistice with Jordan explicitly specified that the agreement did not compromise any future territorial claims of the parties, since it had been "dictated exclusively by military considerations."
As Dr Dore Gold, the renowned expert on Middle East affairs, has pointed out, after the Six-Day War the architects of UN Security Council Resolution 242 insisted that the old armistice line had to be replaced with a new border. "Which is why," Dr Gold writes, "Resolution 242 did not call for a full withdrawal from all the territories that Israel captured in the Six Day War; the 1949 Armistice lines were no longer to be a reference point for a future peace process."
US President Lyndon Johnson made this very point in September 1968: "It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of 4 June 1967 will not bring peace. There must be secure and there must be recognized borders."
The 1949 Armistice line, of course, takes no account of geographical and demographic changes over the past 64 years, so it must be regarded as something of a triumph for John Kerry that, in his meeting with them, the Arab League delegation softened its stance on this issue. Qatari Prime Minister Sheik al-Thani said that the delegation agreed to the possibility of “comparable,” mutually agreed and “minor” land swaps between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
“We’ve had a very positive, very constructive discussion,” said Kerry. “The Arab League delegation affirmed…the two-state solution on the basis of the 4th of June 1967 line* [*note “line” not “border” - NT], with the (possibility) of comparable and mutual agreed minor swaps of the land.”
Israel’s President Shimon Peres, in his visit to Pope Francis on 30 April, designated this development as “a new opportunity for peace.” Prime Minister Netanyahu said on 2 May to a visiting delegation of five US congressmen: “We’re engaged right now in an effort that we appreciate, led by President Obama and Secretary John Kerry, to restart the peace negotiations between us and the Palestinians. We’re eager to do it; we have no preconditions.”
What was not said in the statement by the Arab League, however, is almost as significant as what was – for the League made no mention of Hamas, the Islamist terrorist organization that is the elephant in the room. Controlling a large proportion of any future sovereign Palestine, viscerally opposed to recognizing, let alone negotiating with, Israel, and almost certainly aiming to oust both Abbas from the PA presidency and Fatah from control of the PA, Hamas represents a major obstacle to any peace process as long as it remains in control of Gaza. Most of the knotty problems requiring resolution in a final peace agreement have been discussed ad nauseam in the years of previous negotiations between the two sides, and have pretty obvious answers. What to do about Hamas and the Gaza Strip in any final accommodation remains a loose end.
Kerry’s next move? Well, according to some sources it could be hosting a four-way summit, as a precursor to renewed negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This speculation – which, it must be acknowledged, has been denied by official US spokespersons – also indicated that Turkey, Egypt and other Arab countries might be invited to participate in the summit, though at what level was not made clear. According to these sources, Kerry discussed the planned summit in his recent meetings in Istanbul with the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers, as well as with PA President Abbas. It might also have been be discussed at the White House meeting between President Obama and King Abdullah on 26 April, and could feature on the agenda in the planned mid-May Washington visit by Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Putting aside all speculation, it seems clear that Kerry has taken up his Middle East challenge with energy and enthusiasm. Through undoubted diplomatic skill and the application of sheer persistence, he has injected renewed animation into what many had already written off as a defunct corpse. Whether he and President Obama can succeed in the major enterprise to which they have dedicated themselves – the conclusion of a genuine peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians – where so many have failed before them, time alone will tell. From the standpoint of these early days of May 2013, all we can say is that they have made a positive start.
Published in shortened form in Eurasia Review, 2 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/02052013-israel-and-palestine-signs-of-a-thaw-oped/
Friday, 26 April 2013
A four-way peace summit?
It's a well-known fact that rumours abound in the higher echelons of government, and however absurd some of them might appear to the casual observer, a proportion will, in the nature of things, turn out to be well-founded.
On 25 April 2013, the Israeli daily Ha’aretz, reported that US Secretary of State John Kerry is hoping to convene a four-way peace summit in June, which would see the participation of US President Obama, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and Jordan’s King Abdullah.
The report also suggests that Egypt and Turkey would have some involvement in the meeting, and that the putative summit will be high on the agenda of upcoming visits to Washington by King Abdullah and Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
On 26 April, Ha’aretz reported that the Obama administration, in the person of White House spokesman Patrick Ventrell, had categorically denied the story. Bernadette Meehan, National Security Council Spokesperson, had said: “These reports are not true.” You could scarcely get more categorical than that.
However, neither rumour-mongers nor investigative journalists let a good story slip away as easily as that. Ha’aretz’s well-founded US sources quickly ascribed Washington’s formal denials to a suggestion that Israel may have been upset by the leak of the summit plan, leading the administration to back-track.
And despite the denials, Ha’aretz’s “well-placed American sources” continued to insist that a four-way summit, leading to renewed talks between Israel and the Palestinians, had indeed been discussed with Middle East leaders and foreign ministers. Ha’aretz reports that one diplomatic source told the paper that the sides had been encouraged to “come up with ideas” that would enable the summit to convene.
The sources said that Turkey, Egypt and other Arab countries may also be invited to participate in the summit, though it’s not clear yet at what level. Secretary of State John Kerry, according to these sources, discussed the planned summit in his meetings in Istanbul this past week with the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers, as well as with PA President Mahmoud Abbas.
The highly speculative, twice-denied, summit may also, Ha’aretz reports, be discussed at the White House meeting between President Obama and King Abdullah on 26 April, as well as in a mid-May Washington visit by Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan.
Moving on from speculation to speculation, it is confidently predicted that the summit would most likely take place in Washington in June 2013, although the exact date would avoid clashing with the Israeli Presidential Conference during the same month, which also marks the ninetieth birthday celebrations of Israel’s President Shimon Peres.
It is certainly true that since taking office, Secretary of State Kerry has sought to kick-start direct peace talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders. He has been assiduous in his efforts, making frequent trips to the region, but not always avoiding a bloomer or two.
For example, the rapprochement he brokered between Israel and Turkey during Obama’s visit to the region was far from waterproof. Part of the deal was that the trial in absentia of four Israeli military leaders for their part in the Mavi Marmara incident would be discontinued. It is still being pursued.
During a further visit to Turkey last week, at the height of the furore in the States over the terrorist bombing of the Boston marathon, Kerry referred again to the Mavi Marmara incident. The Mavi Marmara was a Turkish ship that sailed to Gaza in May 2010 in an attempt to break Israel’s blockade against Hamas. Militants attacked Israeli soldiers as they boarded, and the soldiers shot and killed eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American.
“I particularly say to the families of people who were lost in the incident,” said Kerry, “we understand these tragedies completely and we sympathize with them. I have just been through the week of Boston and I have deep feelings for what happens when you have violence, and something happens, and you lose people that are near and dear to you. It affects a community, it affects a country. We’re very sensitive to that.”
Israel’s Deputy Minister of Defense, Danny Danon, rejected Kerry’s attempt to draw a moral equivalence between terrorists and the victims of terror. Republican Jewish Coalition Executive Director, Matt Brooks, said: “Secretary Kerry should retract these remarks as soon as possible. It’s unconscionable to compare the loss of life resulting from an act of self-defence to the results of cold-blooded, premeditated murder by terrorists.”
Nevertheless, it seems clear that John Kerry is deeply committed to achieving results in the Middle East peace process in general, and an accommodation between Israel and the Palestinians in particular. He recently emphasised that urgency is needed over the next two years in order to realise a two-state solution.
Reverting to the rumoured, and denied, summit, it is unclear whether it would be dependent on Kerry having already achieved a breakthrough to pave the way for direct Israeli-Palestinian talks. Kerry has met with Abbas five times in recent weeks in an effort to circumvent the Palestinian leader’s insistence on a settlement freeze as a precondition to resuming negotiations.
“We have two or three weeks left to see if this thing is doable,” one source is reported to have said.
Apparently, the rumour runs, if the summit does take place, terms of reference may be adopted in advance, including the principle of two states for two peoples, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which is aimed at facilitating a comprehensive peace across the Arab world, and economic aid for the Palestinian Authority.
The Israeli daily, Maariv, reported during the week that Kerry has secured agreement for the United States and other foreign powers to invest in large-scale economic initiatives in the Palestinian areas of the West Bank, designed to revive the ailing PA-run economy − undoubtedly a sweetener to help induce the reluctant Abbas to return to the negotiating table, whether or not the four-way summit ever sees the light of day.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 26 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/26042013-a-four-way-peace-summit/
On 25 April 2013, the Israeli daily Ha’aretz, reported that US Secretary of State John Kerry is hoping to convene a four-way peace summit in June, which would see the participation of US President Obama, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and Jordan’s King Abdullah.
The report also suggests that Egypt and Turkey would have some involvement in the meeting, and that the putative summit will be high on the agenda of upcoming visits to Washington by King Abdullah and Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
On 26 April, Ha’aretz reported that the Obama administration, in the person of White House spokesman Patrick Ventrell, had categorically denied the story. Bernadette Meehan, National Security Council Spokesperson, had said: “These reports are not true.” You could scarcely get more categorical than that.
However, neither rumour-mongers nor investigative journalists let a good story slip away as easily as that. Ha’aretz’s well-founded US sources quickly ascribed Washington’s formal denials to a suggestion that Israel may have been upset by the leak of the summit plan, leading the administration to back-track.
And despite the denials, Ha’aretz’s “well-placed American sources” continued to insist that a four-way summit, leading to renewed talks between Israel and the Palestinians, had indeed been discussed with Middle East leaders and foreign ministers. Ha’aretz reports that one diplomatic source told the paper that the sides had been encouraged to “come up with ideas” that would enable the summit to convene.
The sources said that Turkey, Egypt and other Arab countries may also be invited to participate in the summit, though it’s not clear yet at what level. Secretary of State John Kerry, according to these sources, discussed the planned summit in his meetings in Istanbul this past week with the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers, as well as with PA President Mahmoud Abbas.
The highly speculative, twice-denied, summit may also, Ha’aretz reports, be discussed at the White House meeting between President Obama and King Abdullah on 26 April, as well as in a mid-May Washington visit by Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan.
Moving on from speculation to speculation, it is confidently predicted that the summit would most likely take place in Washington in June 2013, although the exact date would avoid clashing with the Israeli Presidential Conference during the same month, which also marks the ninetieth birthday celebrations of Israel’s President Shimon Peres.
It is certainly true that since taking office, Secretary of State Kerry has sought to kick-start direct peace talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders. He has been assiduous in his efforts, making frequent trips to the region, but not always avoiding a bloomer or two.
For example, the rapprochement he brokered between Israel and Turkey during Obama’s visit to the region was far from waterproof. Part of the deal was that the trial in absentia of four Israeli military leaders for their part in the Mavi Marmara incident would be discontinued. It is still being pursued.
During a further visit to Turkey last week, at the height of the furore in the States over the terrorist bombing of the Boston marathon, Kerry referred again to the Mavi Marmara incident. The Mavi Marmara was a Turkish ship that sailed to Gaza in May 2010 in an attempt to break Israel’s blockade against Hamas. Militants attacked Israeli soldiers as they boarded, and the soldiers shot and killed eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American.
“I particularly say to the families of people who were lost in the incident,” said Kerry, “we understand these tragedies completely and we sympathize with them. I have just been through the week of Boston and I have deep feelings for what happens when you have violence, and something happens, and you lose people that are near and dear to you. It affects a community, it affects a country. We’re very sensitive to that.”
Israel’s Deputy Minister of Defense, Danny Danon, rejected Kerry’s attempt to draw a moral equivalence between terrorists and the victims of terror. Republican Jewish Coalition Executive Director, Matt Brooks, said: “Secretary Kerry should retract these remarks as soon as possible. It’s unconscionable to compare the loss of life resulting from an act of self-defence to the results of cold-blooded, premeditated murder by terrorists.”
Nevertheless, it seems clear that John Kerry is deeply committed to achieving results in the Middle East peace process in general, and an accommodation between Israel and the Palestinians in particular. He recently emphasised that urgency is needed over the next two years in order to realise a two-state solution.
Reverting to the rumoured, and denied, summit, it is unclear whether it would be dependent on Kerry having already achieved a breakthrough to pave the way for direct Israeli-Palestinian talks. Kerry has met with Abbas five times in recent weeks in an effort to circumvent the Palestinian leader’s insistence on a settlement freeze as a precondition to resuming negotiations.
“We have two or three weeks left to see if this thing is doable,” one source is reported to have said.
Apparently, the rumour runs, if the summit does take place, terms of reference may be adopted in advance, including the principle of two states for two peoples, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which is aimed at facilitating a comprehensive peace across the Arab world, and economic aid for the Palestinian Authority.
The Israeli daily, Maariv, reported during the week that Kerry has secured agreement for the United States and other foreign powers to invest in large-scale economic initiatives in the Palestinian areas of the West Bank, designed to revive the ailing PA-run economy − undoubtedly a sweetener to help induce the reluctant Abbas to return to the negotiating table, whether or not the four-way summit ever sees the light of day.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 26 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/26042013-a-four-way-peace-summit/
Monday, 22 April 2013
Israel and Palestine - that elusive peace
As the Obama administration sets out once again in pursuit of peace between Israel and the Palestinians − a prize that has eluded the grasp of generations of statesmen and politicians, including US President Obama himself in his first term − it is sobering to consider how close the parties have come in the past to concluding an agreement, only for it to fall at the last hurdle.
A plethora of dates are strewn across the recent history of the Middle East, marking the inauguration of well-intentioned efforts to reach a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To list only some, there were the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Oslo Accord signed on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993, the Wye River Memorandum in 1998, the Camp David Summit in 2000, the Taba summit in 2001, the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, the Road Map for Peace promulgated by the Quartet, and the Geneva Accord, both in 2003, the Annapolis process in 2007, and the Obama administration’s direct peace talks of September 2010.
But all those initiatives, involving so much time and effort on all sides, could have been rendered superfluous. History could have taken a quite different turn, and a sovereign Palestine could have been up and running some twenty-five years ago. For preceding them was the top-secret accord reached between Israel and Jordan at a time when Jordan exercised sovereignty over the West Bank and was in a position to negotiate a binding peace agreement establishing a sovereign Palestine alongside Israel.
Top-secret at the time, today the deal is a matter of public record. A single typewritten sheet of paper dated 11 April 1987 and headed “Secret / Most Sensitive” sets out what is described as: “A three-part understanding between Jordan and Israel” − in essence an agreement to convene and attend an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, charged with reaching a peaceful solution of both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem “in all its aspects”.
The accord specifies that the invitation to attend the conference, as well as the terms of its remit, are to be “treated as US proposals to which Jordan and Israel have agreed.”
Despite the deliberately concise nature of the document, it can be assumed with some confidence that by the time it was signed on behalf of Jordan and Israel, the terms of a comprehensive peace deal had been virtually agreed by both sides.
“The agreement with Hussein,” said Shimon Peres in 2008, during an interview to mark his election as President of Israel the previous year, “was the best and greatest agreement Israel ever had. Alas, we torpedoed it. It was the greatest mistake in our history.”
It was Shimon Peres, then Israel’s foreign affairs minister, who negotiated with King Hussein of Jordan what became known as the “London Agreement” − it was signed in London on 11 April 1987, during a secret meeting held at the residence of Lord Mishcon, a leading UK lawyer and a prominent member of the Jewish community. Also present were Jordanian Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifai and Director General of the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry, Yossi Beilin.
The sting was in the tail of the document. “The above understanding is subject to the approval of the respective governments of Israel and Jordan.” With the king as signatory, the approval of the Jordanian government was a foregone conclusion. The problem − and a major problem it turned out to be − was Israel.
In 1987 Israel was ruled by a fragile and uncertain “national unity government” in which ministers were attempting − often unsuccessfully − to suppress diametrically opposite political beliefs in the interests of providing the nation with effective government. The prime minister was Yitzhak Shamir of the right-wing Likud party; Shimon Peres represented the left-wing Labor party in the cabinet. Chalk and cheese. Although Shamir permitted his foreign minister to undertake the secret negotiations and travel to London, he did not approve of the outcome, fearing that an international conference would force Israel into a solution that would be unacceptable to his party, and would prove divisive in the country as a whole.
Consequently he opposed the agreement, and Peres failed to get the cabinet’s endorsement. The signatories had agreed that their accord would be presented to US Secretary of State George Shultz so that it could be promoted as an American initiative. Shamir sent Moshe Arens, his Minister Without Portfolio, to meet Shultz and block the concept of a UN-hosted peace conference.
King Hussein, disappointed by Peres’s failure to obtain Israel’s endorsement of the agreement, disengaged from the peace process. Yassir Arafat, then Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, launched the first intifada in December 1987, and in July 1988 Hussein withdrew Jordan’s claim to sovereignty over the West Bank. The London Agreement was dead − but the initiative was not without positive consequences. Peres developed and maintained a special and secret relationship with King Hussein of Jordan for many years, leading eventually to negotiations under Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the peace agreement with Jordan signed in 1994.
"King Hussein and Prime Minister Peres have played extraordinary roles, over many years, in pursuing peace and liberty in the Middle East,” ran the encomium, when both men were presented jointly with the Liberty Medal in Philadelphia in 1996. “The 1994 accord between Jordan and Israel is remarkable because it goes beyond the cessation of belligerency and focuses on the normalization of relations. It is a model for the Middle East and a stimulus for the world."
Shimon Peres is now President of Israel. His belief in the desirability of reaching a peaceful accord with the Palestinians remains as firm as ever.
“The peace process with the Palestinians already has an agreed beginning and an agreed solution,” he said, addressing the European Parliament on 12 March 2013. “Two states for two nations. An Arab state – Palestine; a Jewish state – Israel, living in peace, security and economic cooperation. The remaining disputed issues can and should be negotiated. Together with my partner Yitzhak Rabin, we laid down the foundations for peace with the Palestinians. Now it is time to continue − to renew the peace process.”
Hopeful and encouraging words with which to mark the start of yet another journey − long and tortuous as it will doubtless be − in search of that elusive peace.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 21 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/21042013-israel-and-palestine-that-elusive-peace-oped/
A plethora of dates are strewn across the recent history of the Middle East, marking the inauguration of well-intentioned efforts to reach a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To list only some, there were the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Oslo Accord signed on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993, the Wye River Memorandum in 1998, the Camp David Summit in 2000, the Taba summit in 2001, the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, the Road Map for Peace promulgated by the Quartet, and the Geneva Accord, both in 2003, the Annapolis process in 2007, and the Obama administration’s direct peace talks of September 2010.
But all those initiatives, involving so much time and effort on all sides, could have been rendered superfluous. History could have taken a quite different turn, and a sovereign Palestine could have been up and running some twenty-five years ago. For preceding them was the top-secret accord reached between Israel and Jordan at a time when Jordan exercised sovereignty over the West Bank and was in a position to negotiate a binding peace agreement establishing a sovereign Palestine alongside Israel.
Top-secret at the time, today the deal is a matter of public record. A single typewritten sheet of paper dated 11 April 1987 and headed “Secret / Most Sensitive” sets out what is described as: “A three-part understanding between Jordan and Israel” − in essence an agreement to convene and attend an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, charged with reaching a peaceful solution of both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem “in all its aspects”.
The accord specifies that the invitation to attend the conference, as well as the terms of its remit, are to be “treated as US proposals to which Jordan and Israel have agreed.”
Despite the deliberately concise nature of the document, it can be assumed with some confidence that by the time it was signed on behalf of Jordan and Israel, the terms of a comprehensive peace deal had been virtually agreed by both sides.
“The agreement with Hussein,” said Shimon Peres in 2008, during an interview to mark his election as President of Israel the previous year, “was the best and greatest agreement Israel ever had. Alas, we torpedoed it. It was the greatest mistake in our history.”
It was Shimon Peres, then Israel’s foreign affairs minister, who negotiated with King Hussein of Jordan what became known as the “London Agreement” − it was signed in London on 11 April 1987, during a secret meeting held at the residence of Lord Mishcon, a leading UK lawyer and a prominent member of the Jewish community. Also present were Jordanian Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifai and Director General of the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry, Yossi Beilin.
The sting was in the tail of the document. “The above understanding is subject to the approval of the respective governments of Israel and Jordan.” With the king as signatory, the approval of the Jordanian government was a foregone conclusion. The problem − and a major problem it turned out to be − was Israel.
In 1987 Israel was ruled by a fragile and uncertain “national unity government” in which ministers were attempting − often unsuccessfully − to suppress diametrically opposite political beliefs in the interests of providing the nation with effective government. The prime minister was Yitzhak Shamir of the right-wing Likud party; Shimon Peres represented the left-wing Labor party in the cabinet. Chalk and cheese. Although Shamir permitted his foreign minister to undertake the secret negotiations and travel to London, he did not approve of the outcome, fearing that an international conference would force Israel into a solution that would be unacceptable to his party, and would prove divisive in the country as a whole.
Consequently he opposed the agreement, and Peres failed to get the cabinet’s endorsement. The signatories had agreed that their accord would be presented to US Secretary of State George Shultz so that it could be promoted as an American initiative. Shamir sent Moshe Arens, his Minister Without Portfolio, to meet Shultz and block the concept of a UN-hosted peace conference.
King Hussein, disappointed by Peres’s failure to obtain Israel’s endorsement of the agreement, disengaged from the peace process. Yassir Arafat, then Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, launched the first intifada in December 1987, and in July 1988 Hussein withdrew Jordan’s claim to sovereignty over the West Bank. The London Agreement was dead − but the initiative was not without positive consequences. Peres developed and maintained a special and secret relationship with King Hussein of Jordan for many years, leading eventually to negotiations under Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the peace agreement with Jordan signed in 1994.
"King Hussein and Prime Minister Peres have played extraordinary roles, over many years, in pursuing peace and liberty in the Middle East,” ran the encomium, when both men were presented jointly with the Liberty Medal in Philadelphia in 1996. “The 1994 accord between Jordan and Israel is remarkable because it goes beyond the cessation of belligerency and focuses on the normalization of relations. It is a model for the Middle East and a stimulus for the world."
Shimon Peres is now President of Israel. His belief in the desirability of reaching a peaceful accord with the Palestinians remains as firm as ever.
“The peace process with the Palestinians already has an agreed beginning and an agreed solution,” he said, addressing the European Parliament on 12 March 2013. “Two states for two nations. An Arab state – Palestine; a Jewish state – Israel, living in peace, security and economic cooperation. The remaining disputed issues can and should be negotiated. Together with my partner Yitzhak Rabin, we laid down the foundations for peace with the Palestinians. Now it is time to continue − to renew the peace process.”
Hopeful and encouraging words with which to mark the start of yet another journey − long and tortuous as it will doubtless be − in search of that elusive peace.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 21 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/21042013-israel-and-palestine-that-elusive-peace-oped/
Thursday, 18 April 2013
Obama's second try
“If at first you don’t succeed,” runs the old maxim, “try, try, try again.”
You have to hand it to President Barack Obama for persistence.
He came to office in 2009 clearly determined to give a good deal of priority to the Middle East in general, and the Arab-Israeli dispute in particular. To the new administration it must have seemed that this new President, with his black power background, could do things no previous US president could have contemplated. Perhaps an unprecedented approach to the Muslim world, holding out the hand of friendship, would engender a new cooperative atmosphere in which old deeply-ingrained suspicions would dissipate, and peace would stand a better chance than ever before?
“It’s worth a try” must have been the prevailing mood, as Obama made his trip to Egypt in June 2009, and delivered a speech in Cairo best remembered, by some, for passages like this:
“I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition.”
What is usually forgotten about Obama’s Cairo speech, and is rarely quoted, are passages like this:
“America's strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable... Tomorrow, I will visit Buchenwald, which was part of a network of camps where Jews were enslaved, tortured, shot and gassed to death by the Third Reich. Six million Jews were killed – more than the entire Jewish population of Israel today. Denying that fact is baseless, ignorant, and hateful. Threatening Israel with destruction – or repeating vile stereotypes about Jews – is deeply wrong, and only serves to evoke in the minds of Israelis this most painful of memories while preventing the peace that the people of this region deserve.”
So it is undoubtedly true that at the same time as Obama tried to match his “let’s be friends” approach to the Muslim world with conciliatory gestures − to Iran, to Syria, to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, all of which failed − he tried also to press ahead with reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
A very early move was to appoint George Mitchell as his special envoy to the Middle East, charged with bringing the parties back to the negotiating table. Mitchell strove mightily − and with some success − to achieve just that, for in September 2010 Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, did sit face-to-face with Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) at the same negotiating table in Washington, and both talked peace.
The issue that supervened to frustrate this worthy effort, and consequently to freeze the peace process for the next two-and-a half-years, was unfortunately compounded by another of Obama’s mistaken policies.
As Israel’s prime minister, Netanyahu was heading a fragile coalition. Back in November 2009 he had managed to persuade his colleagues - many sceptical of, if not downright opposed to, the idea - to go along with Obama’s request for a 10-month freeze on construction in the West Bank. Obama’s hope was that the PA would use this window of opportunity to get peace discussions well under way. In the event most of the 10 months was frittered away by an Abbas reluctant, or fearful, to commit himself to negotiating peace, and it was only in the final few weeks that, with the agreement of the Arab League and supported by the presence of Egypt’s President Mubarak and Jordan’s King Abdullah, he finally agreed to face-to-face talks. Then, when the 10-month building moratorium drew to a close, he demanded that it be extended if he was to continue with the discussions.
Netanyahu found it impossible to persuade his Cabinet colleagues to renew the freeze on construction, and so the new-born peace process expired. From that moment, however, the Obama administration repeatedly urged Israel to re-impose its moratorium on building in the West Bank. Secretary of State Clinton said more than once that the US regarded continued building within the settlements as an obstacle to peace. But the real obstacle was this attempt of Obama’s to appease Arab opinion. Once the US had urged Israel to desist from West Bank construction, President Abbas was boxed into a corner and it was impossible for him to fudge the issue – as it had been consistently fudged in the past. Construction within the West Bank had never constrained the many previous peace negotiations between Israel and the PA. This time it was an immovable obstacle.
It is, in reality, a non-issue. Both parties accept that in any final agreement the larger West Bank settlements will remain in Israel’s hands. Expanding the infrastructure within these townships, therefore, can have no bearing on any final peace agreement. As for the rest, it is generally agreed that, following the precedent of Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza, as part of a final agreement smaller settlements will be evacuated and handed over to a new sovereign Palestine. In which case the more new construction there is within them, the better the deal, from the Palestinians’ point of view.
Which is doubtless why, in his second attempt to grapple with the formidable Israel-Palestinian issue, Obama is playing a quite different hand.
First he found an opportunity early in his second term to visit the Middle East and to repair his fences with the Israeli public, among whom a certain scepticism about his intentions had been developing. Then, in a signal of the importance he devoted to the matter, he by-passed his Middle East special envoy − George Mitchell’s successor − and nominated his newly-appointed Secretary of State, John Kerry, to carry forward plans to revive the peace process.
Kerry began his new effort with a vigorous succession of visits to the region - three in as many weeks − and brokered a somewhat shaky rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Early indications that he intended to base his new peace effort on reviving the 2002 Arab League peace plan were quickly discounted. Instead, the US has quietly unblocked almost $500 million in aid to the PA which had been frozen by Congress for months, and Kerry promised further economic assistance in developing the Palestinian economy, presumably as a sweetener to the PA to return to meaningful negotiations. Israeli construction in the West Bank has been given no prominence in US pronouncements thus far − mild disapproval of “continued settlement activity” is as far as Obama went in his major speech in Israel during his recent visit.
However, a new spanner thrown into the works is the resignation on 13 April of the PA’s prime minister, Salam Fayyad – which Kerry urged President Abbas not to accept. However Fayyad, greatly respected internationally, has indeed gone – and with him a fair degree of PA credibility. His plan to build Palestinian state institutions from the bottom up received much international support. Fayyad was a symbol of good governance and opposition to the financial corruption within the PA that has still not been fully eradicated. As Barak Ravid wrote in Ha’aretz, “Senior Fatah party members saw Fayyad as an obstacle toward their political and economic ambitions. The Palestinian prime minister refused to transfer funds to them or to appoint them as ministers.”
Fayyad's resignation is a setback to Obama’s plans to promote the peace process. Fayyad was not directly involved in negotiations with Israel, but Washington regarded him as a responsible and trustworthy figure within the PA administration. Regardless of reverses like this, Obama clearly intends to pursue his objective of achieving an Israeli-Palestinian agreement within his second term, if at all possible.
Unfortunately, the facts of American political life mean that if he does not succeed this second time around, there is no third try available to him.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 15 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/15042013-obamas-second-try-oped/
You have to hand it to President Barack Obama for persistence.
He came to office in 2009 clearly determined to give a good deal of priority to the Middle East in general, and the Arab-Israeli dispute in particular. To the new administration it must have seemed that this new President, with his black power background, could do things no previous US president could have contemplated. Perhaps an unprecedented approach to the Muslim world, holding out the hand of friendship, would engender a new cooperative atmosphere in which old deeply-ingrained suspicions would dissipate, and peace would stand a better chance than ever before?
“It’s worth a try” must have been the prevailing mood, as Obama made his trip to Egypt in June 2009, and delivered a speech in Cairo best remembered, by some, for passages like this:
“I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition.”
What is usually forgotten about Obama’s Cairo speech, and is rarely quoted, are passages like this:
“America's strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable... Tomorrow, I will visit Buchenwald, which was part of a network of camps where Jews were enslaved, tortured, shot and gassed to death by the Third Reich. Six million Jews were killed – more than the entire Jewish population of Israel today. Denying that fact is baseless, ignorant, and hateful. Threatening Israel with destruction – or repeating vile stereotypes about Jews – is deeply wrong, and only serves to evoke in the minds of Israelis this most painful of memories while preventing the peace that the people of this region deserve.”
So it is undoubtedly true that at the same time as Obama tried to match his “let’s be friends” approach to the Muslim world with conciliatory gestures − to Iran, to Syria, to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, all of which failed − he tried also to press ahead with reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
A very early move was to appoint George Mitchell as his special envoy to the Middle East, charged with bringing the parties back to the negotiating table. Mitchell strove mightily − and with some success − to achieve just that, for in September 2010 Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, did sit face-to-face with Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) at the same negotiating table in Washington, and both talked peace.
The issue that supervened to frustrate this worthy effort, and consequently to freeze the peace process for the next two-and-a half-years, was unfortunately compounded by another of Obama’s mistaken policies.
As Israel’s prime minister, Netanyahu was heading a fragile coalition. Back in November 2009 he had managed to persuade his colleagues - many sceptical of, if not downright opposed to, the idea - to go along with Obama’s request for a 10-month freeze on construction in the West Bank. Obama’s hope was that the PA would use this window of opportunity to get peace discussions well under way. In the event most of the 10 months was frittered away by an Abbas reluctant, or fearful, to commit himself to negotiating peace, and it was only in the final few weeks that, with the agreement of the Arab League and supported by the presence of Egypt’s President Mubarak and Jordan’s King Abdullah, he finally agreed to face-to-face talks. Then, when the 10-month building moratorium drew to a close, he demanded that it be extended if he was to continue with the discussions.
Netanyahu found it impossible to persuade his Cabinet colleagues to renew the freeze on construction, and so the new-born peace process expired. From that moment, however, the Obama administration repeatedly urged Israel to re-impose its moratorium on building in the West Bank. Secretary of State Clinton said more than once that the US regarded continued building within the settlements as an obstacle to peace. But the real obstacle was this attempt of Obama’s to appease Arab opinion. Once the US had urged Israel to desist from West Bank construction, President Abbas was boxed into a corner and it was impossible for him to fudge the issue – as it had been consistently fudged in the past. Construction within the West Bank had never constrained the many previous peace negotiations between Israel and the PA. This time it was an immovable obstacle.
It is, in reality, a non-issue. Both parties accept that in any final agreement the larger West Bank settlements will remain in Israel’s hands. Expanding the infrastructure within these townships, therefore, can have no bearing on any final peace agreement. As for the rest, it is generally agreed that, following the precedent of Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza, as part of a final agreement smaller settlements will be evacuated and handed over to a new sovereign Palestine. In which case the more new construction there is within them, the better the deal, from the Palestinians’ point of view.
Which is doubtless why, in his second attempt to grapple with the formidable Israel-Palestinian issue, Obama is playing a quite different hand.
First he found an opportunity early in his second term to visit the Middle East and to repair his fences with the Israeli public, among whom a certain scepticism about his intentions had been developing. Then, in a signal of the importance he devoted to the matter, he by-passed his Middle East special envoy − George Mitchell’s successor − and nominated his newly-appointed Secretary of State, John Kerry, to carry forward plans to revive the peace process.
Kerry began his new effort with a vigorous succession of visits to the region - three in as many weeks − and brokered a somewhat shaky rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Early indications that he intended to base his new peace effort on reviving the 2002 Arab League peace plan were quickly discounted. Instead, the US has quietly unblocked almost $500 million in aid to the PA which had been frozen by Congress for months, and Kerry promised further economic assistance in developing the Palestinian economy, presumably as a sweetener to the PA to return to meaningful negotiations. Israeli construction in the West Bank has been given no prominence in US pronouncements thus far − mild disapproval of “continued settlement activity” is as far as Obama went in his major speech in Israel during his recent visit.
However, a new spanner thrown into the works is the resignation on 13 April of the PA’s prime minister, Salam Fayyad – which Kerry urged President Abbas not to accept. However Fayyad, greatly respected internationally, has indeed gone – and with him a fair degree of PA credibility. His plan to build Palestinian state institutions from the bottom up received much international support. Fayyad was a symbol of good governance and opposition to the financial corruption within the PA that has still not been fully eradicated. As Barak Ravid wrote in Ha’aretz, “Senior Fatah party members saw Fayyad as an obstacle toward their political and economic ambitions. The Palestinian prime minister refused to transfer funds to them or to appoint them as ministers.”
Fayyad's resignation is a setback to Obama’s plans to promote the peace process. Fayyad was not directly involved in negotiations with Israel, but Washington regarded him as a responsible and trustworthy figure within the PA administration. Regardless of reverses like this, Obama clearly intends to pursue his objective of achieving an Israeli-Palestinian agreement within his second term, if at all possible.
Unfortunately, the facts of American political life mean that if he does not succeed this second time around, there is no third try available to him.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 15 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/15042013-obamas-second-try-oped/
Sunday, 14 April 2013
Kerry and the Arab-Israeli peace process
The new US Secretary of State, John Kerry, has tentatively dipped his toe into the murky waters of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and has already had it nipped rather badly − not once, but several times.
Barack Obama returned to the White House at the start of his second presidential term clearly determined to make headway in the struggle for an accommodation between Israel and the Arab world. His personal visit to the Middle East shortly after his return to office was an obvious signal of his intention to engage his administration in a new peace-making effort. Back in 2009, on his first time around, Obama had appointed a special Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, to carry forward his attempt to bring Israel and the Palestinians to an agreement. This time he by-passed Mitchell’s successor, David Hale, and − emphasising the importance of the task − has charged his newly-appointed Secretary of State, John Kerry, directly to head it.
An early success, initiated by Kerry three weeks before President Obama arrived in the region, was brought to an apparent triumphant conclusion a few minutes before the president boarded Air Force One for his flight back home. Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, had been persuaded to offer his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as much by way of an apology as he could, diplomatically and politically, for Israeli operational failures during the Mavi Marmara affair. Meanwhile, Secretary Kerry had been conducting intensive negotiations with Turkey for some three weeks, aimed at ensuring that the apology, when tendered, would be accepted.
The apology by Netanyahu was made on the understanding that Turkey would abandon its intention of putting four senior Israeli officials on trial, in absentia, charged with war crimes, while Erdogan’s acceptance was made on the understanding that Israel would pay compensation to the families of the nine Turkish citizens who were killed during the skirmish. It seemed like a acceptable deal for both parties.
The apology was duly made, and apparently accepted, although with a good deal of triumphalist bragging on Erdogan’s part about this “victory” over Israel − an aspect of the affair diplomatically glossed over by John Kerry on his return to Turkey, his third visit to the Middle East in as many weeks. What Kerry cannot ignore, however, is the fact that the lawsuit being heard in absentia in an Istanbul court against four of Israel's most senior retired commanders, including the ex-army chief, has not been dropped and apparently will not be, according to Turkish participants, even if the terms for compensation are agreed. A first sharp lesson to Kerry of the realpolitik that rules in the Middle East − and little assurance that his bid to normalise Turco-Israeli relations will be successful, at least in the short term (“We would like to see the relationship get back on track in its full measure,” said Kerry after meeting with Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu) .
A second rebuff to Kerry followed swiftly, administered as a double-whammy by the Palestinian Authority (PA).
There had been reports that the Obama administration is once again − as at the start of Obama’s first term − pinning its hopes on the Arab Peace Plan of 2002 to provide some sort of template to kick-start the Israel-Palestinian peace process back into life. Israel has never agreed to the Arab League plan, though it has never formally rejected it. Putting it back on the table, it was surmised, was meant to galvanize Arab support and draw in Turkey.
The Arab Initiative offers Israel a comprehensive peace and a renunciation of further Arab land claims in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from land it captured in 1967. In all subsequent discussions between Israel and the PA it has been taken for granted by both sides that in any final agreement the 1967 boundaries would be modified by “agreed land swaps” to account for major Israeli settlements. In addition, the United States was reported to want more security commitments between Arab states and Israel.
In a first brush-off by the PA – which was not enamoured of the Obama-Netanyahu love-in during the US President’s visit to Israel − chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat told the Voice of Palestine radio station last week − “Kerry asked us to change a few words in the Arab Peace Initiative, but we refused.”
Subsequently, Kerry has denied that the US does, in fact, intend to base future negotiations on the old Arab initiative.
And then, before Kerry arrived back in the Middle East, he had asked the PA to refrain from any action that could harm efforts to restart talks on an eventual two-state solution − such as pursuing claims against Israel in the International Criminal Court. All the PA would offer was to do so for a period of eight weeks. “We are not canceling those efforts,” said an official, “but we are freezing them.”
Not the most promising of starts to Obama’s well-intentioned efforts to reactivate the peace process, especially given the other pressing problems in the region − Iran’s nuclear ambitions and what to do about them, the worsening situation in Syria, the knock-on effect of the flood of refugees into Jordan and Lebanon, and the effort to prevent Syria’s stockpile of weapons, both conventional and chemical, from falling into the hands of Iran, its terrorist protegés like Hezbollah, or any of the jihadist groups that hope to come out on top when Syria finally collapses. All of which, compared to 2009-2010, provides a very different backdrop to this current peace effort by Obama.
One western diplomat is reported as saying: "It's too early to be optimistic."
That’s putting it mildly.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 10 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/10042013-kerry-and-the-arab-israeli-peace-process-oped/
Monday, 8 April 2013
NATO and the Israel connection
Israel is, of course, fairly remote from any part of the north Atlantic, so it would be reasonable to wonder why it should have any sort of connection with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). But then NATO has itself travelled a fair distance since 1949 when, after much discussion and debate, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by ten western European nations plus the United States and Canada, with the aim of deterring Soviet aggression at the very start of the Cold War.
The kaleidoscope of political change in the past 65 years has radically altered NATO’s nature and scope. Two landmarks define these changes: the end of the Cold War, which rendered NATO’s defensive strategy against the Soviet Union obsolete, and the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US in 2001, which redefined the enemy and the nature of the battle and which, incidentally, shifted the focus of NATO’s attention from Europe to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and beyond − which is where Israel enters the picture.
NATO, which has on seven occasions added new members and now comprises 28 nations, has also broadened its operations to encompass both a “Partnership for Peace” programme with states of the former USSR, and also a number of “dialogue programs”. Among these is the Mediterranean Dialogue, set up in 1994 and intended to link Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia in security discussions.
Of course, this group of countries lacks any culture of cooperation in security matters, so the programme as such is pretty much a dead letter. Except that out of it, Israel alone has forged extremely close links with NATO. For example, recently Israel became the first country to conclude an individual cooperation programme. Through this it conducts an ongoing strategic dialogue with NATO covering, among other items, terrorism, intelligence sharing, nuclear proliferation, procurement and rescue operations. Israel is also a partner in NATO’s naval control system in the Mediterranean. By joining NATO forces in patrolling the Mediterranean. Israel contributes on a regular basis to Operation Active Endeavor, which was established after 9/11 and designed to prevent the movement of terrorists or weapons of mass destruction.
Given the close relationship that has developed between Israel and NATO, should Israel apply, or be invited, to join as a full member? The question has been raised on more than one occasion, and Avigdor Liberman, while he was Israel’s foreign minister, was convinced that joining NATO would act as a vital deterrent against Iran. But would membership be in Israel’s best interests? Israel’s defence doctrine has been always based on self-reliance and freedom of manoeuvre in security matters. Israel’s unwritten alliance with the United States is, perhaps, a more convenient alternative.
In any event, NATO’s “all for one, one for all” doctrine has acted against any attempt to pull Israel into full integration with the alliance. Other members − especially Turkey − have consistently blocked any such attempts, either on ideological grounds or because Article 5 of the NATO charter would oblige its members to fight for Israel if it were attacked by any of its many potential enemies.
All the same, despite the deterioration in Israel’s international standing in recent years, NATO and Israel have been strengthening their cooperation by leaps and bounds. For example, Israel has recently received approval to participate in NATO activities in 2013 that had been held up amid tensions with Turkey. The approval coincided with NATO agreeing Turkey’s request for Patriot missile batteries to be deployed along its border with Syria. It looks suspiciously as though NATO used this opportunity to induce Ankara to thaw its relations with Israel.
And now it seems as though the ties that bind NATO and Israel are to be strengthened even further. On 7 March 2013 NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Israel’s president Shimon Peres met at NATO headquarters in Brussels to discuss enhanced military cooperation focused on counter-terrorism − enhanced, that is, well beyond the so-called “Mediterranean Dialogue”.
Peres offered to assist NATO in counter-terrorism operations directed not only against Hezbollah and Iran, but against terrorism generally in the Middle East, stressing Israel’s ability to provide technological assistance based on the vast experience Israel had gained in the field of counter-terrorism.
“Israel will be happy to share the knowledge it has gained and its technological abilities with NATO,” Peres told Rasmussen. “Israel has experience in contending with complex situations, and we must strengthen the cooperation so we can fight global terror together and assist NATO with the complex threats it faces including in Afghanistan.”
Their joint statement points to an Israel-NATO partnership “in the fight against terror and the search for peace in the Middle East and the world. Israel and NATO are partners in the fight against terror.”
What this undoubtedly suggests is the participation of Israel in active theatre warfare alongside NATO. In other words, in all but name Israel looks set to become a de facto member of the Atlantic Alliance − a win-win situation both for NATO and for Israel.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 7 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/07042013-nato-and-the-israel-connection-oped/
Friday, 5 April 2013
How Turkey accepts an apology
The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has managed to convince himself – and is doing his best to convince the entire Turkish population − that he has won a great psychological victory over Israel.
As a parting shot in his recent tour of the Middle East, President Obama persuaded his host, Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to issue an apology for failures that occurred in the course of the Israeli military operation during the Mavi Marmara affair in May 2010, when nine Turkish citizens were killed in an attempt to run the blockade of Gaza. The careful wording was as far, politically and diplomatically, as Netanyahu was prepared to go. He made his phone call to Erdogan from the airstrip, while Obama waited to board Air Force One for his return flight to the US.
It is obvious that the President must also have exerted no little pressure on the Turkish prime minister to accept whatever it was Netanyahu was able to say by way of apology, and in addition to withdraw his threat of putting four Israeli military officials on trial in Ankara in absentia, provided Israel financially compensated the families of those who were killed.
They say that the darkest hour is just before the dawn. Perhaps the darkest hour in Turkish-Israeli relations was Erdogan’s outburst in late-February declaring Zionism to be a “crime against humanity”, on a par with fascism. Admittedly, on seeing the general outrage that his remarks had caused, he hastened to soften their impact, but as Alon Liel observed in the Jerusalem Report, speaking for many observers at the time: “Erdogan crossed a red line no Israeli government can ignore. With this slander he has destroyed any hope of an Israeli apology.”
Lo and behold, in the very week that Liel’s prediction appeared in print, the apology was made and – it is presumed – accepted. The acceptance has to be presumed, because instead of any gracious acknowledgement of Netanyahu’s gesture, instead of extending a “thank you” or indicating pleasure in the fact that Netanyahu had made a considerable personal and diplomatic effort to heal relations between Israel and Turkey, Erdogan reacted by trumpeting the apology as a humiliation for Israel and a triumph for himself. Billboards in Ankara read: “Dear prime minister, we are grateful that you let our country experience this pride.”
No-one begrudges the Turkish people feeling pride, but one must ask: ‘pride in what?’ There is no cause for pride in having one’s arm twisted. It was Obama − working through his Secretary of State, John Kelly − who had masterminded three weeks of covert negotiation with the Turkish prime minister and his colleagues, to ensure that the apology, when issued by Netanyahu, was accepted, and that, as a quid pro quo for Israel paying compensation to the families of the Turkish citizens killed in the Mavi Marmara incident, Erdogan agreed to drop charges he had intended bringing against four Israeli officials involved in planning and executing the operation. In short, it is difficult to perceive any Turkish victory over Israel since it was not Erdogan who persuaded Netanyahu to act, but Obama.
The triumphalist posturing adopted by Erdogan since the apology does not augur well for future Turco-Israeli relations. It would have been easy for Erdogan to accept the apology graciously, to grasp the hand of friendship extended to him, to have declared that the episode marked a new beginning in relations between the two countries. The way Erdogan did react makes it seem highly unlikely that his rabid anti-Israel rhetoric will be much modified in the future. He is engaged in a power play – a bid to trump both Iran and Egypt, still racked by its Arab Spring revolution − to achieve regional hegemony, if not leadership of the Muslim world. Erdogan dare not be seen to draw too close to the perennial enemy, even if he wished to – doubtful in itself.
However, a more covert Turco-Israeli rapprochement might develop – growth, perhaps, in sales to Turkey of Israeli defense equipment; possibly exports of gas to or via Turkey from the vast reserves off Israel’s coast just starting to be exploited; maybe restoration of old trade and tourism links. However, even optimistic observers agree that nothing will happen quickly. The re-establishment of confidence and of contacts will take time and patience. Recent reports indicate that negotiating teams charged with restoring ties between Turkey and Israel are to due to begin meeting this week. The Turkish team will be led by Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Feridun Sinirlioglu, former Ambassador to Israel; the Israeli team by Joseph Ciechanover.
Meanwhile on 12 April an Israeli delegation will travel to Ankara to begin discussions on the extent of the financial compensation to be paid by Israel to the families of the Turkish citizens killed on board the Mavi Marmara. There is certainly a gap to be bridged here, if reports are to be believed. Turkey is said to be demanding that Israel pay $1 million per family of each activist killed, while Israel is currently offering each family $100,000 by way of compensation. Negotiations seem likely to be extensive.
Whether Netanyahu should have offered his apology in the first place, whether Erdogan should have responded to it as he did − these matters are now water under the bridge. The fact is that, even if extracted from both sides by American pressure, this unexpected political development is a fait accompli. What is needed now is for both Turkey and Israel to exploit it, taking account of their own interests. Do either have the will, desire or inclination to do so? Time will tell.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 2 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/02042013-how-turkey-accepts-an-apology-oped/
Sunday, 31 March 2013
Where is Iran going?
What are the long-term ambitions of the Iranian regime?
The answer to that conundrum, if indeed it has been fully formulated, is a secret restricted to Ayatollah Khamenei (the “Supreme Leader”), and the tight group of oligarchs of which he is head. As long as they are able to retain complete dominance over the instruments of the state, their grip on the reins of power is well-nigh absolute. That dominance is not, however, without threat.
One predominant aim within the Iranian oligarchy must be to preserve in their own hands the vast access to wealth and power that they have managed to accumulate through a network of foundations, charities and other bodies − essentially business organisations with extensive national and international connections. These are estimated to control some 70 per cent of the national economy outside agriculture and the state-owned industries.
Amir Taheri, a veteran Iranian writer, estimates that in the past 10 years some 200 state-owned enterprises have been “privatized”, in other words transferred to a small group of politicians and mullahs close to the Supreme Leader. Senior Khomeinists, including Khamenei himself, are among major shareholders of over 100 companies. In addition, the oligarchy has divided Iran's foreign trade among its members − for example, trade with much of Asia, China and Japan, is reserved for the Rafsanjani-Bahremani clan.
Perhaps the greatest internal threat to dictatorial regimes in the modern world − as the Arab Spring has vividly demonstrated − is the internet. It is no surprise that the Supreme Leader has denounced the internet as sinful and a means for the West to wage "soft war". Accustomed to censors blocking Facebook, email and foreign news sites, Iranians recently learned that the régime has ambitious plans to block access to foreign-based social media sites and email altogether, and to substitute Iranian versions. The first phase of this “Halal Internet”, as it has been termed, has already being introduced into government departments and the universities. The aim appears to be to isolate Iran altogether from the world wide web, partly perhaps to avoid another Stuxnet-type cyber attack like the one carried out on its nuclear facilities in 2010. Something similar is being attempted in Saudi Arabia. There is, though, some doubt whether either country has the necessary infrastructure to cut off users' access to the internet entirely.
The religious ambitions of Iran’s oligarchy seem to centre on precipitating the introduction of extreme Islamism across both the Muslim, and as much of the non-Muslim, world as possible − for example in Latin America, where considerable inroads have been made via Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador. According to Amir Taheri, under the 1979 Khomeinist Constitution the Supreme Leader represents Allah's sovereignty on earth, is the leader of all Muslims throughout the world, whether they like it or not. and has unlimited powers to decide what Islam is and is not at any given time. Considering that the Iranian religious oligarchy are firm followers of the Shi’ite tradition, this is not a proposition that the vast Sunni Muslim world has ever accepted, or is likely to. Nevertheless, the Iranian oligarchy sees itself as the embodiment of a messianic revolution, opposed root and branch to state structures that require to be cleansed of "corrupt" rulers and Western democratic constitutions.
As the mass of Wikileaks documents released into the public domain in 2010 revealed, many Arab leaders – especially, perhaps, in the Gulf states − view Iran’s bid for leadership of the Muslim world, to say nothing of its covert operations to achieve that aim, with alarm. Their deep-seated fear of a nuclear-armed Iran stems from these activities.
Iran’s bid for regional hegemony has been sustained by the military and financial support it has lavished on Shi’ite organisations like Hezbollah and the Bashar Assad regime in Syria, but also by nurturing the extreme Islamist – albeit Sunni-based − Hamas organisation in the Gaza strip.
Do Iran’s ambitions – which doubtless extend to developing a military nuclear capability as soon as possible − also encompass the physical destruction of Israel? Both the Supreme Leader and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have on numerous occasions declared their desire to see Israel removed from the map of the Middle East. It would not take more than three or four atomic bombs to wipe out Israel’s infrastructure and most of its citizens. Tempted though Iran’s leaders might be − once they possessed the requisite nuclear capability − could the régime contemplate with equanimity the possible response by Israel or the USA to a nuclear strike on Israel?
The balance of probability is that Iran, from mere self-interest, would probably desist from a direct nuclear-based assault on Israel, unless it was part of a concerted action. Iran’s lack of allies in the region render this an unlikely proposition. The old “Shia Crescent” concept – the crescent-shaped area in the Middle East where the majority of the population is Shi’ite − is a busted flush, as far as an active military campaign against Israel is concerned. Two of the major members, in addition to Iran, were Iraq and Syria. Neither are now capable of joining such an alliance; Azerbaijan and Bahrain would not wish to; Hezbollah, although a major player in Lebanon, does not control the government.
A nuclear capability in Iran’s hands, does, however, open up the prospect of much heightened terrorist activity, fostered and supplied by Iran, both within Israel and in the wider world. Which explains the near-universal approval for the sanctions imposed by the United Nations on the Iranian regime for failing to comply with its nuclear obligations.
From the point of view of the West, Iran exemplifies the “rogue state” – a regime intent on advancing its own malign interests and undermining or destroying states which stand in its way, regardless of almost all considerations. The will to control its overweening ambitions, backed by a convincing display of force, is long overdue.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 March 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30032013-where-is-iran-going-oped/
Sunday, 24 March 2013
The Hong Kong solution
President Obama’s recent visit to the Middle East brought with it renewed speculation about a resumption of the peace process, frozen solid since September 2010. Speculation is the operative word, since no serious commentator offers much hope that talks will indeed restart or, even if they did, that either party would have anything new to bring to the negotiating table.
And yet, around the time of the last serious attempt at face-to-face discussions, something out of the ordinary was being aired – something that received very little news coverage at the time, possibly because the talks themselves collapsed so completely.
Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) began in Washington on 2 September 2010 in an atmosphere of high expectation. At that meeting George Mitchell, Obama’s special Middle East envoy, announced that Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, had agreed to meet again in a fortnight, and every two weeks after that.
And then everything ground to a halt. Israel’s “goodwill gesture” − a 10-month moratorium on construction in the West Bank − came to an end, and Netanyahu’s fragile coalition would not countenance its resumption. Abbas declared that he could not continue with negotiations unless all construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem was halted. Total impasse.
But the start of face-to-face discussions had apparently generated some innovative thinking. A very odd, but apparently serious, possibility was reported by the London-based newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat on 29 October 2010. The paper reported that in its secret negotiations with the American administration aimed at clarifying the nature and demarcation of a Palestinian state, Israel had been discussing the option of leasing land in east Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley from the Palestinian state for up to 99 years. Palestinian sources apparently confirmed the story.
According to one of the sources, this initiative, which he said was "American, not Israeli," had been on the table for a while "in order to reach common ground with the Israeli side regarding the borders issue, and to reach an agreement on what will remain under Israeli sovereignty." When quizzed, officials in Washington refused to confirm or deny the report.
Could this possibility re-emerge? Has it legs strong enough to stand?
The prime example of one sovereign state leasing territory from another is, of course, Hong Kong. In the full flood of its imperial expansion, Britain defeated China in the Opium Wars, and China was forced to cede both Hong Kong and the peninsula of Kowloon. During the following decades, Hong Kong flourished, but the island lacked resources such as water and farmland, and Britain pressed China to cede more land. In 1898 it succeeded in gaining rights in areas known as the New Territories on a 99-year lease, due to expire in 1997.
To complete the story, as 1997 approached, it became clear that should Britain attempt to hand back only the New Territories, China would demand Hong Kong and Kowloon as well. So, in late-1984, an agreement was reached: China would take over the entire colony on 1 July 1997, but Hong Kong's unique free enterprise economy would be maintained for at least 50 years. Hong Kong would become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China with the official slogan, "One country, two systems".
Does the Hong Kong model provide any sort of template for a future Israeli-Palestinian accommodation? Of course, extremer right-wing Israeli political opinion will immediately demand: “Why on earth should we lease our own land from the Palestinians?” But if this ever was a US proposal, it was clearly designed to address Israel's key security concern. Netanyahu had made it clear that any peace deal must incorporate border security for Israel, to prevent both weapon smuggling and infiltration by Hamas or other extreme Islamists into a new sovereign Palestine. The leaseback option, it might have been opined, could provide a medium- to long-term solution to that problem, providing sufficient breathing space (up to a century) to allow Israel and the PA to finalise the borders of the new state.
But there is nothing new under the sun − so it is not perhaps surprising to find that as long ago as 2005 a plan was seriously being discussed within the Israeli Labor Party for the biggest Jewish settlement blocs in the West Bank to be "leased" from the Palestinians.
The London Independent newspaper reported in December 2005 that a group advising Amir Peretz, then Labour Party leader, had been considering a proposal for a long-term leaseback of the main settlement blocs on the model of the 99-year Hong Kong agreement. Clearly the proposal was an attempt to square the circle between Palestinian insistence that any two-state solution should broadly conform with Israel's pre-1967 borders, and the view of a wide segment of Israeli opinion that as many settlements as possible should remain in Israeli hands.
Since then, however, even President Abbas has on several occasions acknowledged that in any final agreement the major Israeli settlements would probably remain in Israeli hands, subject perhaps to a land-swap deal. The same, though, would not be true of the plethora of smaller settlements scattered across the West Bank, and it may be that a lease-back deal affecting some of them could form part of a final accord.
The Hong Kong precedent is not a blueprint for achieving a wholesale Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. It might just provide a useful, if temporary, element in constructing a workable solution.
Sunday, 17 March 2013
The Commonwealth, Israel and Palestine
On 11 March 2013 Queen Elizabeth formally signed the “Commonwealth Charter” - a document setting out for the first time 16 core values shared by the peoples of the Commonwealth and their governments.
The Commonwealth is an aspect of contemporary life that most people know little about. Perhaps the Commonwealth games, interspersed every four years between the Olympics, might occasionally raise a flicker of interest, but as for the background or purposes of the organization itself, there is little general knowledge or interest. And yet the Commonwealth has the potential to exert an enormous power for good on global politics. Judging by the charter just signed by Queen Elizabeth as its head, and endorsed by the 54 governments who are members, the organization also has the collective will to do so. What it has so far failed to demonstrate, and may still lack, is the drive to provide positive leadership on the world stage in favour of the core values it professes.
The Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 54 nations most of whom, but not all, were once part of the British Empire. All of them, however, regardless of their individual constitutions, agree to recognize the current British monarch as head of the association. The members have a combined population of 2.1 billion people, almost a third of the world’s population. What unites this diverse group of nations, beyond the ties of history, language and institutions, are the association’s values of democracy, freedom, peace and the rule of law.
Essentially, these are the basis of the 16 core values now enshrined in the charter. They include a commitment by Commonwealth leaders to uphold democracy and human rights (“we are implacably opposed to all forms of discrimination”); to advance international peace and security (”we reiterate our absolute condemnation of all acts of terrorism in whatever form or wherever they occur or by whomsoever perpetrated”); to promote tolerance and respect, freedom of expression, the rule of law, good governance, to protect the environment, provide access to health, education and food for all, promote gender equality and women’s empowerment, and recognise the positive role of young people in promoting these and other values.
The Commonwealth is not a political union, but an intergovernmental organization in which countries with diverse social, political and economic backgrounds are regarded as equal in status. Alongside shared values, Commonwealth nations share strong trade links; trade with another Commonwealth member has been shown to be up to 50 per cent more than with a non-member.
Five countries are currently seeking membership of the Commonwealth. Neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority (PA) are among them – though, as part of former British mandated Palestine, both would have a stronger claim than, say, Mozambique or Rwanda, which are members, or Algeria which has applied to join.
Could a stated intention to apply for membership of the Commonwealth by both Israel and a sovereign Palestine be a positive factor in the process of negotiating a solution to the Israel-Palestine dispute?
One organization that would probably support the idea – way off the map though it might appear at the moment − would be the Israel Britain and the Commonwealth Association (IBCA), a body formed as far back as 1953 with the aim of encouraging, developing and extending social, cultural and economic relations between Israel and the Commonwealth. Over the years the IBCA has developed close links with the British and Commonwealth embassies. Regular meetings, addressed by prominent politicians, diplomats and academics and attended by many members of the diplomatic corps, have fostered a continuing dialogue between representatives of Israel and the nations of the Commonwealth.
And indeed Israel may quite recently have come close to applying to join the Commonwealth. It was only in 2007 that the Jewish Journal reported:
“As a former British colony, Israel is being considered for Commonwealth membership. Commonwealth officials said this week they had set up a special committee to consider membership applications by several Middle Eastern and African nations. Speaking on condition of anonymity, diplomats said those interested in applying include Israel and the Palestinian Authority, both of which exist on land ruled by a British Mandate from 1918 to 1948. An Israeli official did not deny the report, but said, ‘This issue is not on our agenda right now.’”
Perhaps right now it should be. With renewal of the peace process looming – fostered, perhaps, by President Obama’s forthcoming visit to the region and a new Israeli government about to take office with peace on the agenda − some new idea is needed to burnish the old, old arguments. Whatever Israel’s traditional enemies might assert, there is no doubt that Israel’s core values precisely match those of the Commonwealth. The Palestinian Authority could make a reasonable case for aspiring to most of them – though the same could not be said of Hamas, the de facto government of Gaza, an essential element in any future sovereign Palestine. However, it is the PA, as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” that is the acknowledged negotiating partner – and what within the Palestinian body politic might follow any peace agreement is anybody’s guess.
The offer of future membership of the Commonwealth to both Israel and a new sovereign Palestine would provide a new element in any peace negotiations – a previously unconsidered framework within which the two states might flourish, for it would incorporate acceptance of the peace agreement by a swathe of nations from every continent, the assurance of new markets and flourishing trade relations for both parties, and membership of an association dedicated to democracy, freedom and peaceful co-existence.
It’s a thought.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line magazine, 17 March 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=306705&prmusr=kcMZIV25xkaCJCKj%2bmCtk73QtGq9WxgMo9%2bnP0kDcldzu2xITzzOXPQaOaQ3LKtb
Sunday, 10 March 2013
What's wrong with the Human Rights Council?
“Those who do not learn from the past are doomed to repeat it” is an aphorism attributed to the Spanish-American philosopher, George Santayana. To view his maxim in action, look no further than the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC).
The Council is a body still in its infancy – perhaps its only saving grace. Set up only seven years ago by the UN General Assembly, it had one over-riding purpose – to rectify the egregious faults of its predecessor body, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). The UNCHR had been a working body of the United Nations virtually from its foundation in 1946, but over its 60 years of existence it had accrued a raft of distasteful practices which finally made it totally unacceptable to governments and activists alike.
Among its more objectionable usages was to include flagrant human rights violaters among its members and also to elect such people from time to time to chair the commission − representatives of countries like China, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Syria, Libya and Vietnam, all states with extensive records of human rights violations. These individuals, by working against resolutions to the commission which condemned human rights violations, indirectly sustained and promoted despotism and repression throughout the world.
Another major criticism of the old commission was its blatant politicisation, and its practice of using the commission as a platform from which to criticise selective targets. Chief among these was Israel. An analysis in 2002 revealed that the commission had devoted no less than 33 per cent of its country-specific resolutions to condemning Israel in one way or another.
As a by-product of this, the UNCHR was severely criticized for failing to apply the UN charter's standards across the board. When issues such as the stoning of women, honor killings, mutilations, and the apostasy death penalty were raised during the 60th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2004, officials from certain Muslim-majority states rejected any criticism as “interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state."
All this finally became too much even for the General Assembly, which finally voted to disband the old commission and to set up a shining new United Nations Human Rights Council in its place. How has the new body been doing?
It is, perhaps, significant that UNHRC is UNHCR with one letter transposed. In short, you can barely see the difference.
For example, from the time of its foundation in 2006 until 2012, the new council has published no less than 48 reports condemning Israel. During the same period there were 9 reports on Syria’s mass killings of its own citizens, three on the terrorist-supporting repressive régime in Iran, and not one on China, which is far removed from granting its billion citizens basic human rights.
More than this, the council voted on 30 June 2006 to make a review of alleged human rights abuses by Israel a permanent feature of every council session − a resolution sponsored by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Human Rights Watch, calling on the Council to avoid the selectivity that discredited its predecessor, urged it to look at international human rights and humanitarian law violations committed by Palestinian armed groups as well. This proposal has not been followed through.
Between 2001 and 2008 the Special Rapporteur on the question of Palestine to the previous UNCHR, the current UNHRC and the General Assembly was John Dugard, who was quoted as saying that his mandate is to "investigate human rights violations by Israel only, not by Palestinians". Dugard was replaced in 2008 with Richard Falk, who reportedly compared Israel's treatment of Palestinians with the Nazis' treatment of Jews during the Holocaust, and who posted a cartoon on his blog condemned as anti-semitic by a number of countries. The Anti-Defamation League described the cartoon as a "message of hatred", while the US called Falk's behavior "shameful and outrageous" and "an embarrassment to the United Nations", and called on him to resign. Falk remains in office.
As a result of all this, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and former High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson have criticized the council for acting exactly like the old commission − namely, following the political agenda of some of its members as opposed to advancing human rights. Specifically, both the previous UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the current holder of the office, Ban Ki Moon, as well as the council's one-time president Doru Costea, the European Union, Canada and the United States have accused the UNHRC of focusing disproportionately on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
In 2006, Kofi Annan argued that the Council should not have a "disproportionate focus on violations by Israel. Not that Israel should be given a free pass. Absolutely not. But the Council should give the same attention to grave violations committed by other states as well." In 2007, Ban Ki Moon issued this statement: "The Secretary-General is disappointed at the council's decision to single out only one specific regional item given the range and scope of allegations of human rights violations throughout the world."
Which countries’ representatives currently sit in judgement on the human rights record of Israel, the only state in the Middle East with a fully democratic constitution, a free press and an independent judiciary, a society where Arabs serve as members of the parliament and hold senior positions in the state and the judiciary, where Arab citizens have full access to the state’s health and welfare provisions? The UNHRC’s current membership includes Congo, Uganda, Libya, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Uruguay and Cuba − none with human rights records to be particularly proud of.
In short, the old UNCHR and the new UNHRC are at present Tweedledum and Tweedledee. There are signs that the new body is developing a broader and more equitable approach to its work, but genuine reform seems a long way off.
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