One way to Palestinian autonomy

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 18 August 2025

           Over July 28-30 a ministerial conference at the UN representing 17 countries and the Arab League, but boycotted by the US and Israel, produced the “New York Declaration”.  This document set out a phased roadmap​ leading to a demilitarized sovereign Palestinian state, the disarmament of Hamas, ​the release of the hostages, PA reforms, and post-conflict planning. 

            A follow-up summit on Palestinian statehood is scheduled for September 22.  To be held on the sidelines of the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly, this​ ministerial conference will, it is reported, establish a 19-member committee, co-led by France and Saudi Arabia, charged with creating a coordinated, timebound international framework for advancing the two-state solution.

            International players rarely acknowledge the existential danger Israel would face if this snake oil panacea for all the ills of the Middle East did not incorporate cast iron security guarantees for Israel.  Foremost among the dangers are the geographic and strategic realities.  ​

A Palestinian state would control territory only a few kilometers from Israel’s industrial and population heartland​.  For example, at some points the eastern suburbs of Tel Aviv are only some 12 km, or less than 8 miles, from the West Bank border. ​ An Islamist takeover of a new Palestine, either by force or – given the popularity of Hamas and its like – by election, is a real possibility.  If that happened Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion Airport, and Haifa could be under daily missile threat.​  From the West Bank’s high ground, rockets or even mortars could reach major cities in under a minute.

            ​Do the two-state advocates take into account that without complete demilitarization and effective border security, a new Palestinian state would simply represent a convenient launch-pad for future attacks on Israel?  Should extremist groups seize power, an armed enemy state would exist permanently on Israel’s doorstep ​.

The bottom line is that a naïve two-state arrangement ​without guaranteed arrangements that address demilitarization, counterterrorism cooperation and secure borders would create a Gaza–like scenario in the West Bank.  If such a Palestinian state ​were to be established, Israel would face genuine existential dangers.  

​            There is another factor in play.  Supporters of the two-state solution must also take into account that Jordan​ would not regard ​with unmitigated pleasure​ the establishment of a Palestinian state ​on its doorstep unless it was hedged about with ​effective safeguards preventing its takeover by jihadists.

         Jordan already hosts over two million registered Palestinian refugees, while people of Palestinian descent comprise up to a half of Jordan’s population.​

Jordanian leaders from King Abdullah downwards are on record expressing fears of a further mass displacement into Jordan, which they describe as an existential threat that could upset the demographic balance of the state and impose unsustainable financial strains.  They also fear cross-border violence, arms smuggling, and terrorist threats.

So although official Jordanian policy supports the two-state solution, its leaders are wary that unresolved issues around refugees, Jerusalem, borders and security – as yet unaddressed by peace negotiations – could endanger its vital interests. Moreover both in official government statements and through repeated public declarations by its leadership, Jordan has rejected in advance any two-state arrangement that does not incorporate Jordan’s direct input.

Does any sort of mechanism exist which could ensure an independent Palestine but also provide Israel and Jordan with cast-iron guarantees of security and protection from all existential danger?

On May 14, 2015 noted Israeli politician, Yossi Beilin – friend and close associate of Shimon Peres and trusted colleague of Yitzhak Rabin – wrote an article for the New York Times that has become seminal.  Under the title “Confederation is the Key to Mideast Peace,” he wrote: “This idea isn’t new.  For a brief time in the 1990s, it animated some of my earliest discussions about peace with a spokesman whom Palestinians revered, Faisal al-Husseini. But that was before the Oslo Accords of 1993…In hindsight, it is clear that we should have been looking all along at confederation – cohabitation, not divorce.”

            What is a confederation?  It is a form of government in which constituent sovereign states maintain their independence while merging certain aspects of administration, such as security, defense, economic or administrative matters.  A good example is the confederation formed by the seceding states during the American Civil War.  In a federation on the other hand, such as the modern United States, the constituent parts may be fiercely independent, but they are not sovereign, and the emphasis is on the supremacy of the central government. 

            The vision of achieving peace between Israel and the Palestinians through the mechanism of a confederation has its supporters​, even, surprisingly, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas. 

In 2018, when the Trump peace proposals were being drawn up, ​Abbas was asked his views on the idea. He is on record as favoring a three-way confederation of Jordan, Israel and a sovereign Palestine.  

​            Given Jordan’s collaboration, a post-war conference could be dedicated to establishing a ​new legal entity – a confederation incorporating Jordan, Israel and a Palestinian state including the Gaza Strip​ which​ could be brought into existence at the same moment as the confederation itself.  This three-state confederation could, on a small scale, copy the European Union, in which nation states, while retaining full sovereignty, agree to collaborate in certain spheres such as security, defense, economic development or infrastructure.

​            The confederation ​might have among its founding principles the establishment of a collaborative system dedicated to providing hi-tech security and economic growth for all its component states. Such an umbrella entity might also​ undertake to establish a pragmatic status for Jerusalem​, and especially its Old City, satisfactory to all parties. The Israel Defense Forces ​would act in collaboration with the forces of the other parties to guarantee the security of Israel and that of the confederation as a whole.

         With genuine acceptance of Israel as a permanent presence in the Middle East, a three-state confederation covering the whole of what was originally Mandate Palestine might open a hitherto unexplored path leading towards a peaceful and thriving future.   It could set as its objective the transformation of the region within, say, ten years, into a thriving financial, commercial and industrial hub to the benefit of all its citizens – Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian alike. 

         While support for an overriding confederation allying Jordan, Israel, and a sovereign Palestinian state appears occasionally in policy discussions, think-tank papers, and media debates, it is not an official position of any government. Yet it has the potential to overcome many of the problems associated with simply establishing a stand alone state of Palestine.  For that very reason it perhaps merits serious consideration – not least by those ministers attending the projected summit on September 22.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 18 August 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-864426

 

 

As Hezbollah weakens, Lebanon recovers

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 11 August 2025

High drama in Lebanon:  On August 5, in response to mounting US pressure to commit to a disarmament timetable for Hezbollah, the Lebanese government convened a cabinet meeting at the presidential palace in Baabda, just outside Beirut.  The meeting started at 3 pm.  It was still in progress when, at 5 pm, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem appeared on al-Manar TV, Hezbollah’s official television channel, to reject all calls for Hezbollah to disarm, and to issue stark threats to Israel.

If Israel launched a new, large-scale aggression against Lebanon, declared Qassem, Hezbollah, alongside the Lebanese army and the Lebanese people, would defend themselves.

“This defense will lead to missiles falling inside the Israeli entity,” he threatened, “and all the security they have built over eight months will collapse within an hour.”

Bold words, but largely bravado and bluster. Qassem was implying that Hezbollah still enjoys the closest of partnerships with the Lebanese government.  In truth Hezbollah’s former iron grip over the nation has been greatly eroded, and the newly elected government is beginning to assert its authority in areas where for decades Hezbollah’s word has been law.  The “state within a state” is waning, and a truly sovereign state of Lebanon may be re-emerging.

After hours of impassioned debate, the cabinet reached a majority decision.  The Lebanese army would be instructed to develop a comprehensive plan by the end of August for establishing a state monopoly on arms, to be in place by the end of 2025. The declared objective is to bring all weapons in the country under the control of six designated state security forces, thereby ending the autonomy of non-state actors, most notably Hezbollah. Shi’ite ministers representing Hezbollah reportedly walked out of the cabinet meeting in protest before the vote.

At around 7.30 pm prime minister Nawaf Salam held a press conference and announced the decision.  Hezbollah rejected it completely.  The next morning, in a written statement, it declared:  “We will treat this decision as if it does not exist."

For two years Hezbollah and its political allies held Lebanon in a political deadlock, refusing to allow a presidential election.  It was only after the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire that Hezbollah allowed Joseph Aoun to be elected President and the new government to be installed.  

Since then Lebanon’s leadership has been conducting negotiations with US Special Envoy Tom Barrack on a phased plan to disarm Hezbollah and re-establish the Lebanese state’s monopoly on weapons.​  The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have reportedly dismantled over 90% of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, although north of the Litani River Hezbollah retains substantive arms and capabilities.

Hezbollah is no longer what it was, politically or financially.  No longer able to dictate government policy, it does retain a significant bloc in parliament known as Loyalty to the Resistance. As regards its finances, the Al-Qardh Al-Hasan Association (AQAH) operated as Hezbollah’s de facto bank.  In July Lebanon’s central bank banned licensed banks from dealing with AQAH.

Hezbollah’s popularity with the Shia population has historically been rooted in its extensive network of social services. It operated hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies, often providing medical care more cheaply than private institutions, and often at no cost for party members. Funded largely by Iran, it also ran schools, educational facilities, and youth programs. 

Media reports indicate a significant reduction in Iranian financial support and, as of mid-2025, Hezbollah’s health, social service and educational network has been significantly diminished.  Many of its hospitals and clinics have been damaged or destroyed.  Access to health care is limited.  Mobile clinics and international aid groups are filling some gaps, but routine treatments for chronic diseases have been interrupted.

A large number of schools, particularly in the south, have been damaged or repurposed as emergency shelters, and many children are not receiving education.  Hezbollah’s ability to lead reconstruction and social support has clearly been weakened.  Reports indicate a consequent loss of confidence among its traditional support base, particularly among Shi’ite civilians.

The new Lebanese administration is focused on strengthening state institutions. Recent diplomatic efforts have explicitly linked Lebanese demands for Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon with a commitment to extend state authority and restrict Hezbollah’s independent operations and social authority. 

Historically, Hezbollah’s social programs addressed the neglect by central government of the Shia community.  By providing jobs, welfare, and direct aid, Hezbollah created a “shadow citizenry” closely tied to its institutions, reinforcing its political and social influence.  According to a 2024 poll, about 85% of Lebanese Shia polled expressed trust in the group.

However, overall national support was much lower.  Only about 30% of Lebanese said they trusted Hezbollah, while 55% reported no trust at all. Support among Sunnis, Druze, and Christians was minimal (below 16% in each group).

Municipal elections in 2025 showed that Hezbollah and its ally Amal still dominate in southern Lebanon, but reformist and opposition candidates made gains, even in some traditional Hezbollah strongholds. This suggests that Hezbollah’s legitimacy, even within its core constituency, has been damaged by its loss of charismatic leadership and its degraded military position.  It has been further weakened by its inability to protect or rebuild Shia communities devastated by war, and by its perceived role in causing Lebanon’s economic crisis of the past few years.

            In 2023 inflation rose to a staggering 221.3%.  It was reduced to 45.2% in 2024, but by May 2025 government action had brought it down to 14.4% – still too high for stability, but at least under control. 

            Lebanon’s economy, too, has shown signs of fragile recovery since the ceasefire. After a severe contraction of 7.1% in 2024, the economy is projected to grow by 4.7% in 2025, marking its first growth since 2017. This rebound is driven by improved political stability, a recovery in tourism, stronger consumer spending, and modest capital inflows.

            Renewed optimism and a more stable environment have been fostered by the election of a new president heading a reform-oriented government, a new Central Bank governor, key reforms and international support.

But although growth has returned for the first time in years, and inflation is down significantly from its peak, Lebanon’s economy remains fragile.  Sustained recovery will depend on political stability and more by way of reform.  And that depends above all on preventing Hezbollah from regaining anything like the power it has enjoyed in Lebanon for the past quarter-century. 

        Will the newly elected president and government be consistent in their determination to wrest the nation’s sovereignty from Hezbollah’s grasp?  If their reforms stall, or if Hezbollah stages the comeback Qassem seeks, the Lebanese government could once again find itself the junior partner of a dominant power with its own agenda. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 11 August 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-863772

What does recognition mean?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 4 August 2025

“True to its historic commitment to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,” posted France’s President Emmanuel Macron on his X account on July 24, “I have decided that France will recognize the state of Palestine.  I will make this solemn announcement at the United Nations General Assembly next September.”

         With that statement France became the first major Western and G7 country to go beyond merely proposing the two-state solution as the only way of resolving the perennial Israel-Palestine dispute.  Macron’s move is intended to signal support for some kind of renewed peace process leading to that result.  It was also aimed at encouraging other nations to follow suit.

Three decided to do so, two of them G7 nations – the UK and Canada.  Malta, the third, declared its intention unequivocally, but the UK announcement was framed in the form of a disingenuous ultimatum to Israel.  Treating recognition as a sort of punishment for non-compliance, Starmer announced that it would take place unless Israel fulfilled a range of demands framed so that they could not possibly be met in the course of a few weeks. 

What were the demands?  That “the Israeli government take substantive steps to end the appalling situation in Gaza, agree to a ceasefire and commit to a long‑term, sustainable peace, reviving the prospect of a two‑state solution. And this includes allowing the UN to restart the supply of aid, and making clear there will be no annexations in the West Bank.”

Starmer imposed no conditions on Hamas.  He merely demanded, with no means of enforcing his demands, that “they must immediately release all the hostages, sign up to a ceasefire, disarm and accept that they will play no part in the government of Gaza.”

Of course exactly the opposite occurred. ​ Starmer’s announcement was taken by Hamas as a sign that ceasefire negotiations were no longer necessary​.  It broke them off at once​, ensuring that at least one of Starmer's demands on the Israeli government could not possibly be met.

Canada’s announcement was hedged with conditions imposed on the PA.  Prime Minister Mark Carney declared  that recognition would be conditional on the PA undertaking democratic reforms, agreeing to elections in 2026 excluding Hamas, and demilitarization.  Whether this meant that Canadian recognition would not go ahead if these demands were not accepted by the PA was left unclear.

The UK’s announcement has not gone unchallenged. On July 31 no less than 40 peers in the House of Lords, many of them senior legal figures, wrote to the UK’s Attorney General, Lord Hermer. 

        They point out that the Montevideo Convention of 1933 specifies that a recognized state must have a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.  Palestine, say the peers, does not satisfy these requirements.  Its borders are disputed, there is no single functioning government, and since the main Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, are in dispute with each other, it cannot possibly enter into relations with other states.

The letter, referring to Lord Hermer’s own statements on the importance of upholding international law, continues: “You have said that a selective, ‘pick and mix’ approach to international law will lead to its disintegration, and that the criteria set out in international law should not be manipulated for reasons of political expedience.  Accordingly, we expect you to demonstrate this commitment by explaining to the public and to the government that recognition of Palestine would be contrary to the principles governing recognition of states in international law.”

Lord Hermer is unlikely to disclose the rationale behind his advice to the prime minister.  If he did, it is likely to run along these lines:  Legal recognition of a state de jure would mean accepting that it meets the Montevideo Convention conditions of statehood, while political recognition de facto, which could be described as symbolic, reflects support for a cause or a political resolution rather than a legal fact. Most recognitions of Palestine – and some 140 nations have done so – are not legal affirmations of full statehood under international law, but political support for Palestinian self-determination and a two-state solution.  Palestine is perceived by many, perhaps most, as a state in waiting for a future partner to resolve the dispute once and for all.

         An elephant dominates this room.  All those many nations insistent that the only practicable way forward is the two-state solution – many even postulating that this has long been the supreme aim of many Palestinians, denied them by an intransigent Israel – are deliberately blind to the fact that the Palestinian Fatah leadership has rejected specific two-state offers on multiple occasions, while Hamas, its followers, and a majority of Palestinian opinion according to the latest poll, explicitly oppose the concept altogether.

        Among the opportunities missed were the UN Partition Plan of 1947, accepted by the Jewish leadership, rejected by the Arab High Command. Some Arab opinion, including PA President Mahmoud Abbas himself, regards that rejection as a major miscalculation. In 2011, during a TV interview, he said: “It was our mistake. It was an Arab mistake as a whole..."

The Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, had they been carried through, were widely regarded as a step toward establishing an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories.  At the Camp David Summit in 2000 Israel’s then-prime minister, Ehud Barack, offered a Palestinian state covering roughly 92% of the West Bank together with all of Gaza.  Contiguity within the putative state would have been achieved by way of land swaps.  Yasser Arafat rejected the plan, and the breakdown of the talks was followed by the Second Intifada, which effectively ended the Oslo process. 

In man-to-man talks with Abbas in 2008, then-Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert offered 94% of the West Bank, land swaps, shared Jerusalem, and even an international trusteeship over holy sites.  Abbas did not accept.

US Secretary of State John Kerry led talks in 2014 on a two-state plan based on 4 June 1967 boundaries.  Abbas walked away.

As for Hamas and its followers, a two-state solution is entirely rejected.  Hamas’s 2017 revised charter, while accepting a Palestinian state within 1967 borders as a “national consensus,” still refuses to recognize Israel or renounce armed struggle.  To quote: "Hamas rejects any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea."

Given all this, the conundrum is what France, the UK and Canada believe can be achieved from a symbolic recognition of the non-state of Palestine, and how their relentless advocacy of a two-state solution rejected by most Palestinian opinion is intended to advance matters.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Palestinian statehood: what does recognition mean?", 4 August 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-863083

 

The myth of obstinate Israel

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 July 2025

"If a terrorist organization embraces you, you're in the wrong place."
                                                                  - Israel's Minister of Defense
 

        Can 28 foreign ministers be wrong?  That was the number who put their names to a joint statement published on July 21 largely condemning Israel for the continued conflict in Gaza and its attendant miseries. 

What were they jointly agreed on?  

First that the war in Gaza must end immediately.  Next they state as a fact that the Israeli government is denying essential humanitarian assistance to the civilian population, and that they regard this as unacceptable.  

            They condemn the continued detention of hostages by Hamas, call for their immediate release and state, with no ifs or buts, that “a negotiated ceasefire offers the best hope of bringing them home.”

They call on the Israeli government, taking for granted that what they assert is the case, to “immediately lift restrictions on the flow of aid and to urgently enable the UN and humanitarian NGOs to do their life-saving work safely and effectively.”

They condemn as completely unacceptable “proposals to remove the Palestinian population into a “humanitarian city” and strongly oppose “any steps towards territorial or demographic change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,” leaving the impression that this has been declared official Israeli government policy, which is not the case.  It is a plan promoted by defense minister, Israel Katz, and has been met with considerable skepticism.

They then turn to the E1 settlement plan announced by Israel’s Civil Administration.  If implemented, they say, it would “divide a Palestinian state in two, marking a flagrant breach of international law and critically undermine the two-state solution.”

They call for a halt to settlement building across the West Bank and “settler violence against Palestinians”, which they say has soared.

Finally they urge “the parties and the international community to unite in a common effort to bring this terrible conflict to an end, through an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire. Further bloodshed serves no purpose,” they say, and end by threatening to take further action to support an immediate ceasefire and a political pathway to security and peace.

The name Hamas appears in the statement only once, in a call for release of its hostages.  No responsibility for the deteriorating situation in Gaza is assigned to the terrorist organization.

Israel’s response, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), was apt and relevant, but perhaps too brief. It rejected the joint statement, not just for its content but also for “sending the wrong message to Hamas” which, in fact, was quick to praise it.  As Israel's foreign minister, Gideon Saar, wryly observed, if a terrorist organization embraces you, “you are in the wrong place”.

What Hamas wants above all is a continued presence in Gaza once the war has ended.  So the message that Hamas takes from the statement is that international pressure on Israel could yield the result it wants more effectively than agreeing to release hostages. By attributing all the problems in Gaza to Israeli recalcitrance, it gives Hamas a green light to hold out against the latest ceasefire deal - which Israel has in fact accepted - and so prolongs the conflict. 

Finally the MFA claims that the statement by the 28 foreign ministers  “fails to focus the pressure on Hamas and fails to recognize Hamas’s role and responsibility for the situation.  While refuting some of the charges in the foreign ministers’ statement, the MFA response lacks something by way of robust counter-arguments to the unqualified assertions that abound in it.

            Throughout the Gaza war, Hamas-originated propaganda has been absorbed unquestioningly by swaths of Western opinion.  There are, for example, the highly questionable figures about civilian deaths and casualties.  Many Hamas fighters do not wear uniform, so how many, legitimately killed in the course of battle, have been counted as civilians?  The death or injury of any child is truly tragic.  If only war had not been forced on Israel by Hamas’s bloodthirsty pogrom of October 7, 2023.  But the highly emotive figures issued by Hamas of children killed must take into account that “child” is defined as individuals “up to the age of 18”, and that Hamas trains youngsters aged 15 or younger to participate in fighting the IDF.  How many of the claimed children killed were in fact armed militants actively engaged in the conflict?

            The claims in the joint statement about the construction plan known as E1 are not strictly accurate.  The E1 proposals envisage connecting Ma’ale Adumim with Jerusalem, and they would certainly have strategic, political, and emotional impact.  However, as a glance at the map can verify, the assertion that this would entirely sever the West Bank’s north from its south, is untrue.  Palestinian territorial contiguity would be affected, but the entire Jericho corridor would remain open, and north-south access in a variety of ways could remain.  Maale Adumim would still be the easternmost Israeli settlement in the Jerusalem area.

The line running from Jerusalem past Maale Adumi is Route 1, currently the main east-west artery for both Israelis and Palestinians. New by-pass roads for Palestinian West Bank traffic are proposed under E1 development plans.

The joint statement claims that E1 would undermine the two-state solution, but ignores the obvious ever-present question:  Why wasn’t a Palestinian state created in 1947 based on the UN partition plan;  in 1993 and 1995 from the Oslo Accords; from the Ehud Barack offer in 2000;   at the 2007 Annapolis conference; from the 2008 Ehud Olmert peace offer; or from US Secretary of State John Kerry’s initiative in 2013-2014?

The Palestinian leadership has in the past rejected every possible opportunity of achieving a two-state solution, yet the 28 foreign ministers continue to promote it.  Nothing in their joint statement takes account of Palestinian preferences, or even treats the Palestinians as active participants in the conflict, whose past decisions have shaped events. 

   In their calls for “negotiations” as the only means for liberating hostages, the foreign ministers ignore the fact that negotiations have been in progress for some time.  As the MFA response to the joint statement notes: “there is a concrete proposal for a ceasefire deal, and Israel has repeatedly said yes to this proposal, while Hamas stubbornly refuses to accept it.”

Following Hamas’s bloodthirsty pogrom on 7 October 2025, Israel had no alternative but to retaliate.  Benjamin Netanyahu announced two war aims:  to bring back the hostages seized by Hamas, and to ensure its total defeat, so that it could never pursue its aim of repeating 7 October “again and again” as its spokesmen said it intended.

Neither aim has yet been fully achieved, but neither has been abandoned.  The foreign ministers discount the fact that a complete end to hostilities at this stage would leave Hamas with a continuing foothold in Gaza, and the certainty of an enemy remaining on Israel’s doorstep, intent on pursuing its declared aim of eliminating Israel and killing as many Jews as possible.


Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 28 July 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-862329

Published in Eurasia Review titled "How about Hamas?", 1 August 2025
https://www.eurasiareview.com/01082025-how-about-hamas-oped/#google_vignette

 

 

 

Sharaa – friend or foe?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 July 2025

           Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al‑Sharaa (previously known as militia leader al-Jolani), is potentially a major threat to Israel’s security.  At the same time he is potentially a welcome addition to those Muslim leaders prepared to normalize relations with Israel.

Sweida, where violent confrontations have been occurring recently between Druze and Bedouin, is one of Syria’s 14 provinces. It is located in the southernmost part of the country and borders Israel’s Golan Heights. Druze comprise most of its population.  Any destabilization within the province threatens to spill across the border, particularly if Islamist groups still active inside Syria exploit the chaos.  Any security vacuum in Sweida could allow Iranian-backed militias or jihadist factions to establish a foothold near Israel’s northeastern frontier.

            On Sunday, July 13 members of a Bedouin tribe attacked and robbed a Druze man on the province’s main highway.  Sweida, a tinder-box ready to be ignited, erupted. The memory was still raw of the deadly confrontations between Druze residents and Sunni Bedouin armed groups that occurred between April 28 and May 2 – all due to a fake audio clip – and the heavy-handed intervention by Syrian government forces which carried out so-called extrajudicial “field executions” of 19 Druze civilians.  More than 100 Druze were killed in the subsequent fighting.

            At the time, Israel publicly pledged to defend the Druze and warned Syria that further violence against them would prompt a military response.  During the outbreak of sectarian violence in Suweida on July 13 more than two hundred people were killed.  Over the next few days militias affiliated with the new regime in Damascus attacked members of the Druze community.  In Israel members of the Druze minority organized demonstrations, demanding that the government act immediately to protect their co-religionists across the border.

Israel lived up to its promise.  It mounted air strikes, targeting Syrian tanks moving south from Damascus, as well as other Syrian Army vehicles and an airfield in southwestern Syria. On July 15, during the attacks, prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and defense minister Israel Katz issued a joint statement:  “Israel is committed to preventing harm being inflicted on the Druze in Syria, owing to the deep covenant of blood with our Druze citizens in Israel and their historical and familial link to the Druze in Syria. We are acting to prevent the Syrian regime from harming them, and to ensure the demilitarization of the region adjacent to our border with Syria.”

The same day, Syria’s defense minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, secured an agreement between the combatants – the Syrian army, Druze armed factions and Bedouin tribes – and a ceasefire was declared. 

Unfortunately it soon broke down, and Israel continued its campaign by targeting key Syrian government structures in Damascus, including the Defense Ministry headquarters and areas in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace.

Efforts to reach a ceasefire in Sweida continued and, backed by US mediation, an agreement was reached between the Syrian army and Druze factions.  Under the deal government forces began withdrawing, leaving security in the hands of Druze elders and local factions, as part of a “total and immediate halt to military operations”.

Seeking to cement the ceasefire, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and envoy Tom Barrack engaged in urgent talks with both Israel and Syria.  According to Reuters, they agreed “specific steps that will bring this troubling situation to an end tonight,” suggesting a US-brokered de-escalation pact that may include an Israel promise to halt further airstrikes.

Meanwhile, on the evening of July 16, Sharaa gave a televised address to the nation.  What he said was entirely in line with what he has been asserting as his intentions from the moment he was appointed Syria’s interim president on January 29, 2025.

His first major decision had been to suspend the Assad-era constitution.  In his six months as interim president he has made no less than eight official visits abroad, signed agreements to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces into the state, and overseen the drafting of an interim constitution for a five-year transition period.  This document of intent commits the nation’s governance to unity and inclusivity, explicitly pledges to maintain freedom of opinion and expression, and establishes a People’s Committee to function as an interim parliament.   

He seems to have made every effort to distance himself from his al-Qaeda roots, and to present a moderate and pragmatic image.  In public statements he has emphasized his intention to protect minorities and transform Syria into a pluralist state. 

In speaking to the Syrian people on July 16, Sharaa asserted the nation’s sovereignty, but nevertheless praised mediation from foreign sources.  In line with his declared aim of national unity and the protection of minorities, he said: “We are keen on holding accountable those who transgressed and abused our Druze people, as they are under the protection and responsibility of the state.”  He said that responsibility for security in Sweida, “will be handed to religious elders and some local factions based on the supreme national interest.”

In a statement virtually seeking conciliation with Israel, he said that the nation did not fear war, “but we have put the interests of the Syrians before chaos and destruction.”

Before the recent upsurge of violence, several pointers had suggested possible Israel-Syria reconciliation.   

For example, on April 18 US Congressman Cory Mills held a 90‑minute meeting with Sharaa in Damascus during which, Mills reported, Sharaa expressed openness to normalizing relations with Israel, stating Syria could consider joining the Abraham Accords under the right conditions.

Then, during Sharaa’s visit to French President Emmanuel Macron on May 7, both leaders confirmed that Syria has held indirect talks with Israel through mediators.

These positive indications were confirmed on July 19 when, following several days of negotiations, a ceasefire agreement was reached, brokered largely by the US, in which both Syria and Israel pledged to halt offensive operations.  The agreement included terms allowing limited redeployment of Syrian security forces to Sweida, with the understanding that Druze factions would retain some internal security roles. After the truce, Israel permitted Syrian government troops to re-enter Sweida with a limited mandate, aiming to stabilize the situation and safeguard state institutions.

There is no doubt that the tenor of remarks by Sharaa from the start of his governance seem to favor conciliation toward Israel. They suggest a potential openness to the principles of regional normalization and cooperation embodied in the Abraham Accords.  The current Israeli-Syrian truce is another hopeful sign.  If Sharaa eventually delivers the inclusive, unified, well-governed state that he promises, he will have disproved those who currently regard him with suspicion and believe that he can never rid himself of his Al-Qaeda past.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Syria's President Sharaa - friend or foe?", 21 July 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-861604

Published in Eurasia Review titled: "Al-Sharaa - true or false?", 24 July 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/19072025-al-sharaa-true-or-false-oped/ 

War-torn Sudan seeks closer ties to Israel

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 14 July 2024 

            Sudan has been tearing itself apart in a brutal civil war for two long years.  A clash between two powerful military leaders has devastated the population and led to a humanitarian crisis.  The nation’s basic infrastructure – water, electricity, transport, health care – has more or less collapsed.  

            During June and into July nearly half the Sudanese people have been enduring acute food insecurity.  In areas like North Darfur famine-level conditions have been confirmed. One report by Associated Press describes people sucking on coal to relieve their hunger.  Food prices have soared, and people are being forced to eat weeds and wild plants which they boil with salt to make them palatable. 

The bombing of power plants and water systems has led to vast outages, forcing millions to rely on contaminated sources.  As a result, with the healthcare system barely functioning, a major cholera outbreak is sweeping the country with over 78,000 suspected cases and nearly 2,000 deaths in the past year. 

Over 11 million people are internally displaced, and roughly 4 million have fled to neighboring countries where refugee camps also face severe food and water shortages.  Outbreaks of malaria, respiratory illnesses and diarrheal diseases, linked to very poor sanitation and hygiene, are reported rampant in displaced-population areas.

How has this desperate situation come about?

It all began with Sudan’s democratic revolution in April 2019 and the collapse of the 30-year-long regime of Omar al-Bashir.  In the transitional democratic government that followed, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) became head of the ruling Sovereignty Council.  Burhan’s role, representing the military arm in the country's civilian-military collaborative administration, was specified in the power-sharing agreement of August 2019 between the military and the civilian elements within Sudan.  Under that agreement those concerned pledged themselves to move the country in an orderly fashion toward democracy, and to parliamentary elections in 2023. 

However, popular feeling grew increasingly impatient with the obvious lack of progress toward any form of democracy, and also with the administration’s failure to deal with the country’s severe economic problems.  On October 22, 2021 national frustration erupted in a mass protest in the capital, Khartoum, in support of civilian rule.

 Together Burhan and his deputy in the military command, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, orchestrated a military coup and took over control of the country.  It was not long before Burhan was challenged by Dagalo, who had spent some 20 years in the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and now headed the powerful militia. Such a strong force outside the army was seen generally as a source of instability.  Burhan’s plan to merge the RSF with the nation’s formal armed services was the main bone of contention between the two former colleagues.

   What do the two protagonists say they want?  In a series of social media posts Dagalo maintains that he and the RSF are "fighting for the people of Sudan to ensure the democratic progress for which they have so long yearned".  The RSF has a brutal track record, and many find this hard to believe.  Burhan has said he supports the idea of returning to civilian rule, but that he will hand over power only to an elected government. 

In early 2025 the SAF pushed the RSF out of Khartoum and most of Omdurman, giving  Burhan control of the greater part of Sudan, including the capital region.  In February, Burhan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council announced the formation of a new transitional government.  In May, Kamil Idris, a civilian, was appointed prime minister. This administration is accepted by the UN, the African Union, Egypt and a number of other states as the legitimate government of Sudan.

Meanwhile Dagalo and the RSF still control significant parts of western and southwestern Sudan, especially in Darfur and parts of Kordofan. In April 2025, the RSF established a rival “Government of Peace and Unity” to administer the territories under their control, but this entity lacks international recognition and is not considered the legitimate government of Sudan.

In a powerful article in the Jerusalem Post on July 1, Niger Innis, the chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), argued that “Burhan is not a “moderate,” not a “pragmatist,” and certainly not a force for stability. Innis describes him as “an enabler of radical Islam, an ally of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, and most dangerously, a willing tool of Iran’s expanding influence across Africa and the Middle East.” 

Innis maintained that Iranian weapons are flowing through Sudan, and that drone technology is being shipped and assembled there.  He urges Israel to mount “a coordinated campaign to remove al-Burhan and replace his regime with one that is anti-terror, anti-Iran, and aligned with the Abraham Accords vision of regional cooperation, economic development, and peace through strength.”

That reference to the Abraham Accords is significant. Sudan is, of course, one of the four Arab states that signed up to them.  In fact, it was Burhan himself who met Israel’s then-prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in February 2020 in Uganda, where they agreed to normalize relations.  On January 6, 2021 in a quiet ceremony in Khartoum, Burhan signed Sudan up to the Abraham Accords.

The battle between the SAF and the RSF swung back and forth until March 26, 2025.  On that day Burhan’s SAF regained control of the presidential palace in Khartoum.  What Innis fails to mention is that just one week later, Burhan sent his envoy, Al-Sadiq Ismail, to Israel. A report by Sudanese outlet Al-Rakoba said the visit remained secret until after Ismail had returned.

It then emerged that Ismail had been tasked with delivering several messages to Netanyahu.  First he conveyed Burhan’s desire to consolidate the normalization process.  In exchange for Israeli support in Sudan’s internal conflict against the RSF, he was prepared to re-sign the Abraham Accords in a formal public ceremony.   Another purpose for the visit was to ask Israel to assist in promoting Burhan to the US administration and easing tensions with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 

None of that translates into Burhan leading Sudan into becoming Iran’s newest proxy.  He made overtures to Iran in about 2023 because Israel, wary of becoming entangled in Sudan’s civil conflict, had refused to provide him with military support at a time when his struggle against the RSF was going badly.  On the face of it, Burhan now appears ready to strengthen Sudan’s ties with Israel.  In return Israel might very well help bring humanitarian relief to the Sudanese population, and restore the nation to stability.

Published in the Jerusalem Post titled: "Sudan seeks closer ties" and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Sudan seeks closer ties with Israel", 14 July 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-860841

Who will fund Gaza’s reconstruction?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 July 2025

          On March 4 Egypt presented to a meeting of the Arab League a detailed and costed plan for the reconstruction, development and administration of post-war Gaza. It was approved unanimously and is now Arab League policy. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who was present at the meeting, "strongly endorsed" the Egyptian plan, and pledged the UN’s full cooperation in implementing it.

            The president of the African Union, Joao Lourenco, also attended the Cairo summit and gave the plan his explicit support together with a commitment to help realize it.

            Since then it has been endorsed by the EU.  Statements from the EU High Representative, Kaja Kallas,  and the President of the European Council, Antonio Costa, confirm that the EU sees the plan as a serious basis for discussions on Gaza's future​.  They have offered "concrete support" from all 27 member countries.

            In addition France, Germany, Italy and the UK have all separately backed it.

            The Egyptian initiative addresses both immediate humanitarian needs and the long-term governance and reconstruction of Gaza.  It envisages a three-phase process: first, immediate humanitarian action;  then a multi-year reconstruction effort; and finally establishing a new governance structure for Gaza.

The first phase is planned to be completed in about six months; the rebuilding and governance reforms are estimated to last about a further four to five years.

            The plan explicitly excludes Hamas from any involvement in the future governance of Gaza.  It also bars the Palestinian Authority (PA) from direct administrative control, but it does envisage an umbrella-type council composed of Palestinian technocrats, operating under the auspices of the PA but supported by an international Governance Assistance Mission.  In addition, to maintain security during the transition, it proposes the establishment of an International Stabilization Force to be led by Arab states.

            It is obvious that the cost of rebuilding Gaza’s towns and cities and their infrastructure will be astronomic.  Egypt’s three-phase plan puts it at $53 billion, to be expended over the 5 years.  For the first six months of humanitarian relief, the reconstruction program is costed at $3 billion.  Phase two, which would involve rebuilding infrastructure such as roads and utilities, and constructing 200,000 permanent housing units, would cost some £20 billion.  The final phase, lasting two-and-a-half years and costing $30 billion, aims to complete infrastructure, build another 200,000 housing units, and develop industrial zones, ports, and an airport.

           To finance this $53 billion plan, Egypt proposes establishing an internationally supervised trust fund to receive, channel and manage financial support from a wide range of international donors. It specifically calls for the ​involvement of the World Bank:  "a World Bank-overseen trust fund will be established to receive pledges to implement the early recovery and reconstruction plan."

The plan proposes that Egypt will host an international conference, in cooperation with the UN, to coordinate donor contributions, with the World Bank providing oversight to ensure transparency and effective fund management.  The World Bank has a long-standing presence in Gaza and the West Bank, where it ​has been managing similar trust funds and coordinating with international donors for development and reconstruction projects.

           The task of reconstructing Gaza is enormous, and $53 billion is a very great deal of money to have to find. The donors likely to finance Egypt's plan include a mix of international and regional actors. ​Oil-rich nations such as Saudi Arabia and​ Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ​have deep pockets and a history of regional spending, including in Gaza. ​With an interest in curbing Iranian influence and stabilizing the region​, they are expected to be key contributors, potentially ​expected to provide at least $20 billion initially. ​A number have indicated that their one proviso is that Hamas, with its links to ​the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran, is to have no role in Gaza’s redevelopment and future governance.

           The Egyptian plan envisions mobilizing diverse sources of international aid and investment, so organizations like the UN and global financial institutions, including the World Bank and the EU, are expected to offer financial support. Development agencies, investment funds, and development banks from various countries ​will also ​be targeted.

           Egypt is a strategic ally of the US, already supported to the tune of over $1 billion annually, so it is not impossible to envisage the US assisting in the reconstruction program. Washington is interested in regional stability, counterterrorism, and preventing refugee spillover into other regions. Support could be either by way of specialist construction and infrastructure suppliers contracted by the administration, or by direct financial donation provided under the guise of humanitarian aid – a sort of post-conflict Marshall Plan-style initiative.

Another possible major donor is China.  China and Egypt are already tied closely since Chinese firms are involved in building Egypt’s new administrative capital and in developing a major industrial zone in the Suez Canal region.  China may well respond favorably to a request from Egypt to help realize its Gaza reconstruction plan, perhaps regarding it as an opportunity to strengthen its strategic position in the Middle East.

China is already investing heavily in the region through its Belt and Road initiative, as well as with strategic investments, trade partnerships, infrastructure development, and diplomatic engagement.  Enjoying a relatively neutral position in the Israel-Palestine conflict, China is in a formal strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and has close ties with the UAE, which is a key re-export hub for Chinese goods to the region and Africa. Chinese firms are involved in post-war infrastructure rebuilding in Iraq, and China is heavily invested in infrastructure and renewable energy projects in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.

Meanwhile Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is actively preparing a major donor conference aimed at securing the required financial commitments. Egypt’s plan explicitly calls for broad-based international ​attendance, including Arab states, the EU, China, the US, and other global actors. 

Eyebrows may be raised at the idea of the US and China sitting down together to discuss ​the f​inancing of Gaza reconstruction, but in fact they have both taken part in similar multilateral donor processes in the past, even when their broader relations were tense. Examples are the 2019 Global Fund’s conference, and the International Donors’ conference “Together for the People in Turkey and Syria” in 2023. The urgency of Gaza’s humanitarian crisis and the need for broad international legitimacy make their participation likely.

Both would expect to benefit from contracts worth millions of dollars to construct or reconstruct elements of a restored Gaza, but even so the program’s directors may need to look further afield to find specialist firms to undertake elements of the extensive building and infrastructure operations required.  When the tenders go out for these lucrative contracts, competition will be fierce.

As for the donor conference, it has waited for an end to hostilities in the region.  Given the current political climate, it might soon be convened.  

Published in the Jerusalem Post and Jerusalem Post online titled:  "Paying for 'the day after':  Who will fund Gaza's reconstruction?" 7 July 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-860132

Published in Eurasia Review, 12 July 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/12072025-who-will-fund-gazas-reconstruction-oped/